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NEGLIGENCE IN THE COURTS: INTRODUCTION AND
COMMENTARY'
RICHARD W. WRIGHT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The drafting of the basic negligence provisions in the Restatement
Third of the Law of Torts has brought into sharp focus the increasing
controversy in recent years over the definition of negligent conduct
that should be and actually is employed by the courts. Until fairly
recently, there seemed to be widespread agreement that the definition employed by the courts is an aggregate-risk-utility test,1 as
apparently stated in section 291(1) of the first Restatement and
section 291 of the Restatement Second:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act
is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the
law regards as the
utility of the act or of the particular manner in
2
which it is done.
The aggregate-risk-utility test is often referred to as the "Hand
formula"-a reference to Judge Learned Hand's mathematical
formulation of the test in his 1947 opinion in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.3 According to Hand's formula, a person's conduct is
negligent if and only if the risk (P times L) created by the conduct is
greater than its utility (B), where P is the probability of an injury

t Copyright © 2002 Richard W. Wright. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby
granted to copy for noncommercial purposes as long as appropriate citation is made to this
publication.
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 144-146 (2000); JOHN G. FLEMING,
THE LAW OF TORTS 114-19 (8th ed. 1992); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 16.9 at 467-80 & n.37 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 31 at 170-73 & n.46 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM J. STEWART. DELICT 61-62 (2d
ed. 1993) (Scottish law); FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN
AUSTRALIA 414-18 (2d ed. 1993); cf. B.S. MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A
COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 74 (3d ed. 1994). But see text accompanying note 11 infra.
2. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291(1) (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291
(1965).
3. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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occurring, L is the magnitude of the injury, and B is the burden or
cost that would have to be borne to avoid engaging in the conduct,
including the foregone benefits expected from engaging in the con4
duct.
However, the general assumption that the authors of Restatement section 291 or Judge Hand meant to adopt a rigorous aggregaterisk-utility test of negligent conduct is questionable. Although it is
now rarely noted, the first and second Restatements attached significant qualifications and exceptions to their risk-utility test, including
the requirement that the utility of the conduct in question be assessed
by its social value as recognized by the law. There is even reason to
believe that the drafters of the first Restatement had in mind a nonbalancing, prohibitive-cost test, which was designed to deter juries
from treating as negligent the inherent, irreducible risks of socially
valuable activities.5 As for the Hand formula, Judge Hand repeatedly
cautioned against a literal reading of the formula. He viewed it as a
mere pointer toward the usually relevant factors, 6 with the ultimate
resolution of the negligence issue being based on independent
considerations of justice. In an opinion in a labor law case in 1944, he
stated:
[T]he same question [of considering the costs and benefits to the
different parties] often arises in the law of torts; e.g. negligence,
trade-marks, unfair trade, indeed all questions which depend on
what conduct is 'reasonable.' In all these cases the court balances

4. Id. at 173.
5. See Richard W. Wright, Justice and ReasonableCare in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JUR.,
at pt. II (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care].
6. In Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949), Hand stated:
It is indeed possible to state an equation for negligence in the form, C = P x D, in
which the C is the care required to avoid risk, D. the possible injuries, and P, the
probability that the injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not taken. But of these
factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, and often that is
not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not admit of even
approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be
estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and, besides, probability
varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory;
and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the factors
may be determinative in any given situation.
Id. at 149; see Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[The three factors] are
practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, and the second two are generally not so,
even theoretically. For this reason a solution always involves some preference, or choice
between incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because their decision is thought most
likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied.").
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the interests
against each other, and awards priority as seems to it
7

jUSt.

Recent investigations of the history of the aggregate-risk-utility
test have rejected Richard Posner's claim that the courts implicitly
used the test long before its apparent adoption in the first Restatement." These studies conclude that, with a few possible exceptions,
the courts did not use the test, explicitly or implicitly, prior to its
apparent adoption in the first Restatement, and that the Restatement's apparent adoption of the test had a minimal impact on the
courts. 9 Even today, apart from one minor exception, state pattern
jury instructions do not refer to the aggregate-risk-utility test, but
rather define negligence as a failure to exercise the "ordinary care" or
"reasonable care" that would be exercised by the "reasonably prudent" or "reasonably careful" or "ordinary prudent" person."' Torts
treatises, although generally assuming that the aggregate-risk-utility
test is the test that is actually employed by the courts, increasingly
express significant reservations and qualifications about its use. 1
Although a number of justice-oriented scholars once argued that
the aggregate-risk-utility test is consistent with and indeed required
for the attainment of justice, they now almost universally agree that it
is inconsistent with the principles of justice. 12 This should be clear
with only a little reflection. It is not properly respectful of the equal
dignity and autonomy of others, and hence not just, for you to impose
substantial unaccepted risks of injury or loss upon them merely for
7. Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 142 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1944) (emphasis
added). Stephen Gilles first noted this illuminating statement by Judge Hand. See Stephen G.
Gilles. On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard,
and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 846 (2001) [hereinafter Gilles, Hand Formula Balancing].
8. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 85-148 (1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29
(1972).
9. See Gilles, Hand Formula Balancing, supra note 7, at 822, 837-43, 845 n.104: Stephen
G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 489, 501-04 & nn.38 & 40 (2002) (in this issue) [hereinafter Gilles. English Negligence
Law]; Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605,
1615-31 (1997); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1279 n.168 (2000):
Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law. 45 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 731 (2001).
10. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1016-20
(1994) [hereinafter Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula]; Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt,
What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 587 (2002) (in this issue); text accompanying notes 69-70, 75-78 infra.
11. See Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care, supra note 5, at pt. II.
12. See id. at pt. V: Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law. in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 252-54 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Wright, Standards of Care].
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your own personal benefit, even if your gain will exceed their loss.
Indeed, corporations and individuals who are thought to have done so
are at great risk of being held liable for punitive damages. 3 Conversely, even though it is morally praiseworthy for a person voluntarily to impose significant burdens or risks upon herself in order to
attempt to rescue another from a dangerous situation that she did not
create, it is not just to legally require her to do so, even if the risk to
her seems to be substantially less than the expected utility of the
rescue attempt. 4 If she nevertheless decides to. expose herself to
serious risk in an attempt to save another helpless person from a
dangerous situation that was negligently created by a third party, and
she is injured or even killed while making the attempt, she will
properly be praised as a hero rather than being judged contributorily
negligent, even if the risk of her suffering injury was greater than the
chance of her saving the other, unless her attempt was foolhardy,
rash, wanton, or reckless because there was no fair chance of saving
the other. 5 In sum, although it makes no difference under the
aggregate risk-utility test who is getting the benefits and who is
suffering the losses, or who is putting whom at risk for whose benefit,
it makes a big difference as a matter of common morality and the
6
principles of justice that are a part of that common morality.
Considering all of the above, one might expect that the drafters
of the negligence provisions in the Restatement Third would take a
hard look at the actual resolution of the negligent-conduct issue in the
courts in the various types of recurring situations, and that, having
done so, they would back off from or at least further qualify the riskutility balancing language that is contained in the first two Restatements. At first glance, they seem to have done so. Although the
blackletter definition of negligence and its opposite, reasonable care,
in section 3 of the draft Restatement Third does not mention (as it
should) the importance of considering the respective rights positions
of the parties, it lists the three Hand-formula factors as primary rather
than exclusive factors to be considered, and it does not explicitly
incorporate them into an aggregate-risk-utility test:

13. See Gilles. The Invisible Hand Formula, supra note 10, at 1046-47; Wright, Standards of
Care. supra note 12. at 263; Gary T. Schwartz. The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1013. 1035-38 (1991).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. f, § 314 & cmt. c (1965).
15. See Wright, Standardsof Care, supra note 12, at 270-71.
16. See id.. passim.
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A person acts with negligence if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable
care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the
foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden
that would be borne by the person and others if the person takes
precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm. 7
However, the seeming retreat from the prior Restatements' apparent aggregate-risk-utility test turns out to be a mirage. In fact, the
comments and notes to section 3 in the draft Restatement Third go
much further than the first two Restatements in explicitly setting
forth an unlimited and unqualified cost-benefit version of the
aggregate-risk-utility test. Comment e states:
Balancing risks and benefits. Insofar as this section identifies
primary factors for ascertaining negligence, it can be said to suggest
a "risk-benefit test" for negligence, where the "risk" is the overall
level of the foreseeable risk created by the actor's conduct and the
"benefit" is the advantages that the actor or others gain if the actor
refrains from taking precautions. (Hence this benefit is the same as
the burdens which the precautions, if adopted, would entail.) The
test can also be called a "cost-benefit test," where "cost" signifies
the cost of precautions and the "benefit" is the reduction in risk
those precautions would achieve. Overall, this section can be referred to as supporting a "balancing approach" to negligence.
The balancing approach rests on and expresses a simple idea.
Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh its advantages,
while conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its disadvantages. The disadvantage in question is the magnitude of the risk
that the conduct occasions: as noted, the phrase "magnitude of the
risk" includes both the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of harm, should an incident ensue. The "advantages" of the conduct relate to the burdens of risk prevention that
are avoided when the actor declines to incorporate some precaution. The actor's conduct is hence negligent if the magnitude of the
18
risk outweighs the burden of risk prevention ....
Moreover, the draft Restatement abandons the prior Restatements' emphasis on evaluating the affected interests in terms of their
social value as recognized by the law. All such language has been
completely eliminated. The draft Restatement defines the legally
cognizable benefits as "the advantages that the actor or others gain if
the actor refrains from taking the precautions... [including] the
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
§ 3 (Tentative Draft. No. 1, May 2001) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT

PRINCIPLES)
THIRD].

18. Id. § 3 cmt. e at 41.
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burdens which the precautions, if adopted, would entail," and it notes
that the burden of precautions [i]n many cases.., is a financial
burden borne originally by the actor, though likely passed on, to a
substantial extent, to the actor's customers."' 9 While comment h to
section 3 admits that "in certain cases there may be burdens of risk
prevention that negligence courts properly discount or decline to
acknowledge," giving as an example the foregone excitement that
some motorists might obtain by racing a railroad train to a highway
crossing, it asserts that "[i]n most circumstances, negligence law takes
into account and credits whatever burdens of risk prevention are
actually experienced by the actor and others. ' 20 The reporters' note
to comment h erroneously claims that the relevant comments in the
prior Restatements "generally equate[] social value with private
value" and "deal[] with 'social value' in ways that render uncertain
any difference between social value and ordinary private value. '2 1 It
also erroneously asserts that "modern cases applying the negligence
standard have given little or no attention to the Second Restatement's
distinction between 'legal opinion' and 'popular opinion' and its
distinction between 'social value' and private value," 2 adding, "To be
sure, this lack of attention may not be inconsistent with the Restatement Second, which recognizes the distinctions but explains
them in ways that diminish their significance. ' 23
In sum, as commentators have universally stated in criticizing the
draft Restatement Third 2 4 the draft explicitly adopts an almost totally
19. Id. at 41-42.
20. Id. § 3 cmt. h at 47.
21. Id. § 3 cmt. h. Reporters' Note, at 69-70: see Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care.supra
note 5, at pts. II & lII.
22. DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17. § 3 cmt. h,Reporters' Note, at 70. The
reporters even overlook statements in modern cases on which they rely. For example, the court
in Phillips v. Croy, 363 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. App. 1977) (cited in DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD.
supra, § 3 cmt. d, Reporters' Note, at 55), noting that "[t]he definition of 'reasonableness'
includes 'just,' or 'proper,"' emphasized that "the determination of what constitutes
'reasonableness' or the 'reasonable man' includes a law policy element" and stated "[i]f it were
purely a fact standard, then would not the conclusions of the trier of fact be unassailable and
community polls as to what is reasonable be outcome determinative?" Id. at 1285 & nn.1-2
(citations omitted); see text accompanying note 78 infra.
23. DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. h. Reporters' Note, at 70.
24. See, e.g., Gilles, Hand Formula Balancing, supra note 7. at 854: John C.P. Goldberg,
Introduction, 54 VAND. L. REV. 639, 643 (2001): Stephen Hetcher, Non-UtilitarianNegligence
Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 863. 864, 872 n.38 (2001):
Stephen R. Perry, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 893,
895-96 (2001); Kenneth W. Simons. The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Encompassing Fairness As Well As Efficiency Values. 54 VAND. L. REV. 901. 915-17,
936-39 (2001).
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unconstrained, reductionist cost-benefit test of reasonableness in
negligence law. The reporters claim to find support for this reductionist cost-benefit test in the American and British case law, jury instructions, treatises, and articles by interactive ("corrective") justice
scholars as well as economic efficiency scholars, and they claim that it
is supported by principles of fairness and justice as well as overall
social welfare. 5
As I discuss in another article, the reporters' assertion that their
aggregate-risk-utility test is normatively supported by principles of
fairness and justice is simply not plausible, as almost all interactive
justice scholars now agree.26 This symposium was organized to
evaluate the reporters' descriptive claims, by investigating and
reporting on the way(s) in which the courts understand and apply the
negligent-conduct requirement in actual practice. Although the
primary focus is meant to be descriptive, the theoretical implications
of the descriptive findings are discussed. The symposium was organized on short notice, and I am very grateful to the outstanding
scholars who agreed to participate and who produced such thorough
and useful articles.
Stephen Gilles's article adds to his previous valuable investigations of the historical development and application of the negligence
concept in the Anglo-American common law.27 He focuses this time
on British negligence cases. He finds that in Britain as in the United
States there was minimal use of cost-benefit language or analysis by
the courts prior to the middle of the twentieth century, when references to the burdens of precaution became more frequent, especially
in workplace injury cases. His careful exposition of the British cases
discloses that the references to the burdens of precaution have
generally been part of an explicit or implicit prohibitive-cost analysis,
rather than an aggregate-risk-utility balancing analysis. For the
limited categories of cases that he investigated, almost all of which
involve defendants putting others at risk, a defendant is deemed
negligent for failing to take precautions unless the risk was relatively
25. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. d, Reporters' Note, at 54-63.
For discussion of "interactive justice" as a term preferable to "corrective justice." see Richard
W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1883 & n.113 (2001)
[hereinafter Wright, The Principles of Justice].
26. See Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care, supra note 5, pts. III-V; text accompanying
notes 12-16 supra.
27. See Gilles. Hand Formula Balancing, supra note 7: GilIles. The Invisible Hand Formula,
supra note 10; Stephen G. Gilles, Inevitable Accident in Classical English Tort Law, 43 EMORY
L.J. 575 (1994).
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small and the burden of further precautions would be great and
would result in a significant adverse impact on the desired benefits
that the activity provides to those (such as the defendant's
employees) who are being put at risk or to everyone in society. Gilles
also confirms, as I have previously claimed, that the applicable
standard of care varies depending on the relationship between the
parties, and in particular depending on who is putting whom at risk
28
for whose benefit.
Patrick Kelley and Laurel Wendt investigate the "pattern" jury
instructions that judges in the various states use to instruct juries on
the negligent-conduct issue. They have performed an invaluable
service for practicing attorneys, judges, and tort scholars by successfully undertaking the difficult task of gathering, collating, and analyzing all of the states' current pattern jury instructions on the
negligent-conduct issue. The pattern instructions are presented in an
appendix to their article. In their article, they summarize the history
of and rationales for the adoption of pattern jury instructions, categorize and analyze the various types of pattern instructions on the
negligent-conduct issue, and discuss the compatibility of the instructions with various theories regarding the proper definition of negligent conduct. They find that the instructions, which generally focus
on the "ordinary" or "reasonable" care exercised by the "reasonably
prudent," "reasonably careful," or "ordinary prudent" person and,
with one very limited exception, make no mention of risk-utility or
cost-benefit balancing, are incompatible with the aggregate-riskutility interpretation of negligent conduct.29
Ron Allen and Ross Rosenberg's investigation of American
courts' employment of the aggregate-risk-utility test of negligent
conduct is a fortuitous occurrence, since neither of them specializes in
tort law. They were drawn to the negligent-conduct issue as part of
their ongoing study of the interrelationship of legal theory and legal
practice. Noting that a significant portion of general "top-down"
legal theories misconceive the nature of the legal phenomena they are
meant to explain, they hypothesize that certain areas of the lawthose characterized by "ambiguity" (indefiniteness or gaps in the law
that are not resolved until a decision is reached in a particular
dispute), unpredictability ("computational intractability" due to the
complexity of relevant considerations), and "common-sense"
28. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9; text accompanying notes 39-65 infra.
29. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10; text accompanying notes 66-93 infra.
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understanding and reasoning (rather than the application of special
expertise) - are not amenable to modeling or explanation through
such general "top-down" legal theories.3 " They view negligence law,
with its focus on reasonableness and its applicability to a broad range
of accidental harms, as an example of such an area of the law, and
they contrast it with antitrust law.31 After noting courts' and legislatures' general disregard of theoretical scholarship, as opposed to
doctrinal scholarship,3 2 they focus specifically on the extent to which
courts resort to the general principles of either of the two primary,
competing general theories of tort liability-the efficiency theory and
the interactive ("corrective") justice theory-when resolving the
negligent-conduct issue in particular cases. While they present
substantial evidence of the American courts' lack of use of the Hand
formula's aggregate-risk-utility test, which is championed by efficiency theorists, their only evidence of the American courts' alleged
lack of resort to the principle of interactive justice is the lack of any
significant change in jury instructions as a result of the outpouring of
33
theoretical interactive justice scholarship in the last thirty years.
Unlike the other contributors to this symposium, Anita
Bernstein does not address the substantive criteria of reasonableness
that are employed by the courts. She focuses instead on the important yet relatively neglected issue of the perspectives-objective or
subjective-that are used when applying the substantive criteria to
evaluate individuals' conduct in different types of situations. She
elaborates a novel communities-of-constraint explanation for the
courts' application of a more subjective perspective, rather than the
usual objective perspective, to plaintiffs and certain categories of
defendants, and she criticizes the draft Restatement Third's rationales
and its failure to recognize the more subjective perspective that is
34
often applied to plaintiffs, especially mentally deficient plaintiffs.
This symposium initially was supposed to have two other contributors, Ellen Bublick and me. Bublick, expanding on her earlier
valuable discussion of the (improper) application of the contributory
30. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory:
A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 683-88 (2002) (in this
issue).
31. See id. at 684-89,706-07.
32. See id. at 690-95.
33. See text accompanying notes 94-163 infra.
34. See Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standardsof Care Possible, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 735 (2002) (in this issue); text accompanying notes 164-244 infra.
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negligence defense to rape victims, 31 planned to discuss the standards
the courts apply in a variety of situations to determine whether a
plaintiff's contributory conduct was negligent. Unfortunately, she
had to withdraw from the symposium for compelling reasons beyond
her control. My expected contribution was to be a detailed examination of the cases cited in the reporters' notes of the draft Restatement
Third that allegedly show widespread judicial acceptance and use of
the aggregate-risk-utility test of negligent conduct. Being unable to
timely complete the written analysis of the many cited cases, I had to
withdraw that article, which will be published elsewhere.
However, I can report here the substance of my not-quitecompleted analysis of the cited cases: in very few (if any) of the cases
that are cited by the reporters for the draft Restatement Third did the
courts actually use the aggregate-risk-utility test to resolve the negligence issue. In at least one of the cited cases, the court explicitly
rejected the Restatement's aggregate-risk-utility test. 36 In a substantial number of the cases, there was no reference to risk-utility balancing. In all but a few cases, the references to risk-utility balancing
that did occur were mere window-dressing. In those cases in which
the courts purported to apply risk-utility balancing, the actual holdings usually are inconsistent with risk-utility balancing and are based
on other (justice-related) grounds. This is true even for the two
judges most identified with the aggregate-risk-utility test of negli3
gence: Learned Hand and Richard Posner. 1
As a substitute for my planned contribution, I provide below
more detailed summaries and commentaries on the articles by the
other contributors, hopefully in a manner that ties the several articles
together in furtherance of the overall objective of this symposium:
shedding light on the conception of negligent-conduct that prevails in
actual practice in the courts. As a further contribution to that effort, I
include at an appropriate point a discussion of the previously unpublished results of empirical studies that I conducted in 1994 on the
American courts' actual use of the aggregate-risk-utility test, partially
revised and elaborated for this symposium.', At the end of this
Introduction and Commentary, I propose for consideration by the
35. Ellen M. Bublick. Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1999).
36. See text accompanying notes 110-11 infra.
37. See Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the "Hand Formula", 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2002).
38. See text accompanying notes 108-20, 124-27, 135-57 infra.
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American Law Institute, and independently by the courts, revised
blackletter statements on the evaluation of persons' alleged negligent
conduct, which I believe are more descriptively accurate and normatively attractive than the blackletter sections and accompanying
comments in the draft Restatement Third.
II.

STEPHEN GILLES: BRITISH NEGLIGENCE CASES

Stephen Gilles focuses on British negligence cases for two cogent
reasons. First, in contrast to the unexplained (and little studied) jury
findings on the negligent-conduct issue in the United States, which
generally are based on an unelaborated "reasonable prudent person"
instruction and are subject to very deferential judicial review, the
almost total abandonment of the use of the jury in civil cases in
Britain during the first third of the twentieth century has required
that British trial judges make and explain findings on the negligentconduct issue, and these findings by the trial judges are subject to less
deferential review than that accorded (in Britain or the United
States) to juries' unexplained findings. Thus, British cases generally
will result in more elaboration of the standards that are employed to
evaluate alleged negligent conduct and of the actual application of
those standards to the facts in the particular case.3 9
Second, Gilles notes, various scholars have relied on the British
cases to support their claims, on the one hand, that the courts accept
the Hand formula's aggregate-risk-utility test of negligent conduct
and, on the other hand, that the courts reject the Hand formula's
aggregate-risk-utility test and instead adopt one or more tests based
on the concept of interactive justice.40 An in-depth look at the British
cases can usefully evaluate these competing claims.
Gilles identifies three competing conceptions of a general test of
negligence that have a plausible basis in the British cases: (1) a
"substantial foreseeable risk" approach, according to which an actor
is "negligent -regardless
of the difficulty of taking additional
precautions-for creating substantial, reasonably foreseeable risks of
harm to others"; (2) a "cost-benefit balancing" approach, which
Gilles equates with the familiar Hand-formula test, according to
which an actor is negligent if and only if "the burden of avoiding a
reasonably foreseeable risk is outweighed by the benefits of doing
39. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 489-90.
40. See id. at 491, 499-500.
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so"; and (3) a "disproportionate-cost balancing" approach, according

to which an actor is negligent for creating a reasonably foreseeable
risk of harm to others "unless the burden of precautions [required] to
avoid [the risk] would have been 'disproportionate' to [i.e., much

greater than] the risk."41
Gilles correctly states that I believe that American as well as
British courts rarely employ the Hand formula's "cost-benefit balancing" test, but rather employ different tests (some of which "leave

room for balancing") in different types of situations. 42 However,
Gilles incorrectly states that "[Wright] appears to agree with Weinrib

that the substantial risk approach is the norm, and balancing the
exception(s). '' 43 In the article of mine that he cites, I claimed that a
version of the "substantial foreseeable risk" test applies only in
situations in which the defendant is engaging in the risky conduct
solely for the purely private benefit of the defendant or some third
party. In all other contexts, I describe quite different tests, all of

41. Id. at 490-91; see id. at 496-98.
42. Id. at 500 (citing Wright, Standardsof Care, supra note 12); see id. at 566-69.
43. See id. at 500 (citing Wright, Standardsof Care, supra note 12). Michael Green, in an
otherwise excellent article, has similarly misstated my position. See Green, supra note 9, at 1625
n.90 (quoting Wright, supra, at 263). Green also states that I view the risk-utility test for
defective product designs as a "true risk-balancing test that balances the risk of the design to
consumers with the benefits that the design provides," and he wonders "why, if it is 'highly
doubtful' that courts can do the marginal analysis required by [the economic efficiency
interpretation of] the Hand formula in negligence cases, as Wright claims, that they can do it in
design defect cases." See Green, supra, at 1611 n.28. He again fails to note my explicit contrary
statements:
[I]n this [participatory plaintiff] context a type of risk-utility test is proper under the
equal-freedom theory. But the benefits taken into account are limited to those
expected by the typical plaintiff, rather than also including (as the utilitarian efficiency
theory [and the Hand formula] would mandate) any independent utility to the
defendant or aggregate social utility. Moreover, the comparison of risk and utility is
not a simple quantitative comparison of non-weighted factors, as is assumed by the
utilitarian efficiency theory. Depending on the values involved, the comparison may
be qualitative rather than quantitative, or may involve weighted or lexically ordered
factors, or both. For example, rarely, if ever, would serious risks to life or health be
deemed outweighed by mere economic benefits.
There are many examples of cases in this category. Among the most common
nowadays are suits by a product purchaser or user alleging defective design by the
product's manufacturer.
A common (but not exclusive) test of defect or
reasonableness in such cases is an explicit risk-utility test, which in all but a handful of
cases focuses solely on the risks and benefits to the typical consumer, rather than on
any independent utility to the defendant or aggregate social utility.
Wright, supra, at 267 (citing language from the Restatement Third of Torts on Products Liability
that affirms such a limited, consumer-oriented, "risk-utility" test for defective product designs);
see id. at 270 ("The comparison of risks and benefits is not a quantitative measurement and
balancing of marginal risks and expected utilities, but rather a common-sense assessment of the
relevant risks and utilities, which may be and often are assessed qualitatively or lexically rather
than quantitatively.").
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which consider certain benefits in addition to the risks (depending on
who is putting whom at risk for whose benefit and the acceptability of
the risk to those being put at risk), but none of which employ unlim44
ited cost-benefit balancing or, often, any balancing.
To properly understand Gilles's descriptive claims, not simply
with respectto my position but more importantly with respect to the
British cases, one must pay careful attention to his very broad and
inconsistent use of the word "balancing" and the phrase "cost-benefit
balancing." References to "balancing" tests of negligence, especially
when referring to the Hand formula, are generally understood to
mean a literal or "straight" balancing of aggregate risks or costs
against aggregate utilities or benefits, according to which the actor is
negligent if and only if the aggregate risks or costs are greater (by
whatever amount) than the aggregate utility or benefits. 45 As we have
noted, the draft Restatement Third's "balancing" test of negligent
conduct adopts such a rigorous (but not necessarily marginal)
comparison of total risks and benefits. 46 It thus is potentially
misleading to use the term "balancing" to refer to any test of
negligence, such as Gilles's so-called "disproportionate-cost
balancing" test or several of the tests that I have attributed to the
47
courts, that does not assume such literal or "straight" balancing.
44. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 261-74. Gilles assumes that the
"foreseeable significant risk" test of negligence does not require that there have been some
feasible means for the defendant to avoid creating the risk. See Gilles, English Negligence Law,
supra note 9, at 501-02 n.34. However, such ability to affect the foreseeable risk through one's
conduct constitutes the required volitional-conduct aspect of "tortious conduct," which must be
satisfied prior to any inquiry into whether such volitional conduct was negligent or otherwise
tortious, as all proponents of the "foreseeable significant risk" test have assumed. See, e.g.,
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 76-78 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little.
Brown & Co. 1963) (1881).
45. See, e.g., Green, supra note 9, at 1642 ("Learned Hand, likely influenced by Bohlen's
work [as reporter for the first Restatement], set forth in Carroll Towing a very rigorous
statement of a risk-benefit test .... Yet, at the same time, much of what has been termed as
risk benefit [in the defective product design cases] deviates in varying degrees from a rule that
would provide optimal deterrence."). At one point, even Gilles assumes the more usual
interpretation of "Hand formula balancing." He states that an argument that "implies that the
defendants may be negligent even if the costs of abandoning the cricket ground are greater than
the expected accident costs... is plainly inconsistent with a Hand Formula balancing approach,
in which costs and benefits are compared at the margin." Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra
note 9, at 522.
46. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra; Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care,supra
note 5, at pt. III.
47. In a footnote, Gilles states "[j]ust how this balancing should be conducted is a different
question-and one to which a variety of different answers can be given," citing articles by
himself and Ken Simons that seem to treat essentially any negligence test as a "Hand Formula
balancing" test. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 496 n.14 (citing Gilles,
Hand Formula Balancing, supra note 7, at 816-21; Simons, supra note 24, at 906-25). In his
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Gilles's inconsistent use of the phrase "cost-benefit balancing" is
also likely to mislead the unwary. Despite his initial distinction
between "cost-benefit balancing" and "disproportionate-cost
balancing"-a distinction that reinforces the natural impression that
"cost-benefit balancing" is meant to be understood in its usual literal
or "straight" balancing sense-Gilles frequently describes courts'
explicit or implicit resort to the "disproportionate-cost" test as
alleged "cost-benefit balancing. ' ' 48 Indeed, he treats any reference to
precaution costs as involving "cost-benefit balancing"-for example,
the statements of the judges in Herrington that a land occupier is not
required to incur significant burdens (as perceived by the land occupier and measured by his own resources and needs) to avert accidental injuries to trespassers, but need only take non-onerous precautions
49
involving slight trouble and expense.
Only this very expansive interpretation of "cost-benefit balancing" enables Gilles to claim that "cost-benefit balancing is now a
major (but not dominant) feature of English negligence law."', He
himself admits, in answering his immediately following question,
cited article, Gilles states that "the Hand Norm-in its most general, inclusive form-stands for
the pragmatic proposition that persons should choose to take greater care when the expected
good consequences outweigh or overbalance the expected bad consequences." Gilles, Hand
Formula Balancing, supra note 7, at 820. He includes within "Hand Formula balancing" not
only Richard Posner's aggregate-wealth maximization and utilitarians' social-welfare
maximization, but also Greg Keating's "social contract approach" that "interprets the Hand
Norm as balancing freedom of action against security so as to maximize the overall well-being of
individuals." Ronald Dworkin's "equality of resources" approach that "interprets the Hand
Norm as supporting an egalitarian norm of equal resources, and deploys the willingness-to-pay
criterion for that purpose," and James Gordley's "virtue-based approach" that "interprets the
Hand Norm as commanding that persons choose prudently and jettisons the Hand Formula, but
uses the Hand Factors to try to arrive at an intuitive understanding of which course involves the
lesser evil." Id. at 819-20 (citations omitted).
Simons's conception of "balancing" is so broad that, as Simons himself says, it "verges
on the vacuous" as a limitation on possible tests of negligent conduct. See Simons. supra, at 903.
It encompasses (without explaining how) an approach that he describes as utilitarian and as
maximizing social welfare even though it includes "such values as equality and distributive
justice." See id. at 919. It even encompasses an alleged "balancing" approach. "not exclusively
utilitarian" and not subject to any maximization requirement, that allows the decision maker to
consider "morally relevant features of the situation other than aggregate welfare ... including
intentions, motives, rights, consent, social role or responsibility, justifiable expectations or
reliance of others, and reciprocity and distribution of risk." See id. at 919, 923.
48. See, e.g., Gilles, English Negligence Law. supra note 9, at 491, 492-93, 502 n.35, 509,
passim.
49. Id. at 569-70: cf. Wright, Standardsof Care, supra note 12, at 265-66. Gilles describes
the standard of care articulated in Herrington as being "[i]n effect,... a reverse
disproportionate-cost test: there is no liability unless the benefits of precautions are
disproportionately greater than the burdens." Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at
570 n.334.
50. See Gilles. English Negligence Law. supra note 9. at 493.
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"[but] which version [of "cost-benefit balancing"] -straight costbenefit balancing or disproportionate-cost balancing-predominates?," that "if forced to choose one formulation to describe
balancing in English negligence law, I would say that actors must take
reasonably practical precautions, that is, precautions whose costs are
not disproportionate to their benefits."'" He later states:
[T]here is no rule that the judge is to decide for the defendant if the
costs of avoidance are found to be even a tiny bit larger than its
benefits. Indeed, I have yet to come across a judicial statement to
that effect. The "mood" in which English judges balance seems
more akin to the disproportionate-cost test. .... 52
Moreover, from what I can gather from reading Gilles's careful
descriptions of the cases, the "disproportionate-cost" test as
employed by the courts is more stringent than Gilles acknowledges.
It is not "a relatively relaxed version" of the test that merely requires,
in order to avoid a finding of negligence, that the benefits of the
defendant's conduct "plainly outweigh" the risks." Rather, it is a
prohibitive-cost test that requires that the risk not be too serious (in
the cases that Gilles discusses it generally was considered to be very
low), be necessary for the obtaining of some benefit desired by those
being put at risk or by everyone in society rather than merely a
private benefit to the defendant, be reduced to the maximum extent
feasible without significantly impairing the desired benefit (i.e., no
"extreme" or "drastic" precaution costs), and be significantly
outweighed by the desired benefit.
As Gilles notes, this prohibitive-cost test resembles the test that I
claim that the courts use when assessing the alleged negligence of
54
defendants engaged in socially essential or important activities.
Viewed through different lenses, it is the test, as Gilles again seems to
concede, that is applied in situations in which the persons being put at
risk are willing participants (employees, customers, consumers,
spectators, etc.) in the defendant's risky activity, which takes into
account only the benefits to the participants in the activity unless the
activity is socially essential or important.5 5 Contrary to Gilles's
51. Id. at'493; see id. at 500 ("English judges do not routinely and overtly balance B against
PL except in employment cases, and when they do they often use the 'disproportionate-cost'
approach.").
52. Id. at 584-85.
53. See id. at 500.
54. See id. at 567; Wright, Standardsof Care, supra note 12, at 264-65.
55. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 568, 569-70; Wright, Standards of
Care, supra note 12, at 267-68; note 43 supra.
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assertions, in both categories of cases (which Gilles believes
constitute "probably a majority" of British tort litigation) the
prohibitive-cost test, which does not even involve any balancing, is
quite different from the Hand formula's unlimited "cost-benefit
56
balancing"
Gilles acknowledges that "there is at least some truth in Wright's
contention that English courts apply the negligence standard differently depending on the relationship between plaintiff and defendant,
and in particular depending on who is seen as creating the risk and
benefiting from it."" 7 He adds, "[I]n addition to the Herrington
[trespasser] case, which strongly supports Wright's position, it seems
fair to say that English judges have been more attracted to the
substantial-risk approach in stranger cases than in employment or
other consensual settings." ' Indeed, in the only stranger case that
Gilles discusses in which the relevant benefits of the risky activity
were viewed by the court as purely private benefits to the defendant,
which is the only type of situation in which I claim that the "substantial foreseeable risk" test of negligence applies, the court refused to
take into account those private benefits. 9
Gilles describes the "varying standards" that he acknowledges
are applied in these and other distinct types of situations, such as the
medical treatment and informed-consent situations, 60 as "cost-benefit
balancing (suitably tailored), ' ' 61 and as thus, along with his own
discussion of the British cases, rendering "plainly incorrect" my claim
that British courts rarely engage in cost-benefit balancing. 62 For the
reasons briefly stated above, I believe that Gilles's discussion of the
British cases, even though the cases encompass only a few of the
56. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 569.
57. See id.; note 61 infra.
58. Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 569 n.331; see id. at 538 n.181, 571-72,
579-81; note 49 and accompanying text supra.
59. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 577 n.371 (discussing H. & A. Scott
v. J. Mackenzie Stewart Co., 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 69); text accompanying note 44 supra.
60. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 568-69, 570; Wright, Standards of
Care, supra note 12, at 268-69.
61. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 569-70; id. at 582 n.398
(acknowledging that "the nature of the relationship is a factor in the application of the
negligence standard," but arguing that "the relational focus complements balancing rather than
supplanting it"). Gilles does not discuss two situations in which the existence of distinct, nonbalancing tests of negligent conduct is especially clear: those involving defendants' "nonfeasant"
failure to attempt to rescue or otherwise aid someone whom the defendant did not put at risk,
and those involving plaintiffs who voluntarily put themselves at great risk in an attempt to save
someone else. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 270-74.
62. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 569.
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situations that I have discussed, greatly reinforces rather than
undermines my claim. Gilles himself states, as a "simple but fundamental point," that "English judges balance: intuitively, qualitatively,
verbally, impressionistically, and on the basis of their largely tacit
assessments of what is fair and socially valuable. 63 Furthermore, he
notes, "English judges continue to use the reasonable man standard..., sometimes without resort to balancing." 64 It seems to me
that Gilles's article not only disproves, as Gilles states, Richard
Posner's and William Landes's efficiency-based, marginal "costbenefit balancing" test of negligent conduct, 65 but also disproves the
existence in British law of any "cost-benefit balancing" test of negligent conduct, given the usual interpretation of "cost-benefit
balancing."
III. PATRICK KELLEY AND LAUREL WENDT: AMERICAN PATERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

As we noted above, unlike in Britain, in the United States the
negligent-conduct issue is still usually decided by juries, and juries'
determinations on this issue are usually subject to deferential judicial
review. Therefore, to get an idea of how the standards of negligence
are actually conceived and applied in the United States, one needs to
know how they are conceived and applied by juries. In their contribution to this symposium, Patrick Kelley and Laurel Wendt tackle
this difficult problem. They focus on the content of the "pattern" or
uniform jury instructions that exist in almost all states, which judges
generally use to instruct juries on the standard that the jury should
employ to resolve the negligent-conduct issue. Given the "black box"
nature of the jury-which simply returns a verdict of liability or no
liability or at most an unelaborated and unexplained finding (through
a special verdict) on the negligent-conduct issue-and the lack of
empirical studies on how juries actually resolve the negligent-conduct
issue, the instructions provided to the jury are the only information
66
we have on how juries view the negligent-conduct issue.

63. Id. at 494 (emphasis added). Compare Judge Hand's similar comment, quoted in the
text accompanying note 7 supra.
64. Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 500.
65. See id.
66. This assumes, of course, that juries actually understand and attempt to follow the
judge's instructions. In part IV of their article, Kelley and Wendt cite various empirical studies,
all of which conclude that juries generally are conscientious and attempt to follow the judge's
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In addition, Kelley and Wendt observe, the pattern jury instructions provide the closest-to-the-action view of judges' actual working
conception of the negligent-conduct issue. The pattern instructions
are usually drafted by a committee of highly respected practitioners
(trial lawyers and judges) and "the occasional practical-minded law
professor," who "attempt to embody in the pattern instructions an
accurate and understandable statement of the law as it has been set
out by the state's highest appellate court" rather than according to
some academic theory of what the negligence standard supposedly is
or should be. 67 The pattern instructions thus also provide a means for
assessing the descriptive accuracy of the various academic theories
regarding the negligent-conduct issue, which is a question that Kelley
and Wendt also pursue.
With respect to the basic instructions defining negligent conduct,
Kelley and Wendt find that "[tihe only formulation that did not show
up in any of the pattern instructions was the conduct of the ordinary,
reasonable person, the long-time favorite of torts scholars." 6, The
great majority of instructions instead state that a person is negligent if
he or she fails to exercise "reasonable care" or "ordinary care," which
is further defined as the care that is exercised by the "reasonably
prudent," "reasonably careful," or "ordinary prudent" person (not,
Kelley and Wendt point out, the "ordinarily" prudent or careful
person as is stated in a few states' instructions-a phrasing that
erroneously implies that occasional lapses in care are not negligent).69
Many of the formulations are paraphrases of the language in a
leading English case: "Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."' 70
Kelley and Wendt consider the extent to which the definitions of
negligence embodied in the pattern jury instructions are consistent
with various academic conceptions of the meaning of negligence.
They worry initially about whether any "single descriptive theory" is
possible given what they seem to view as significant variations in the
states' instructions, e.g., the specification of "ordinary" versus "reainstructions. Some studies, however, conclude that juror comprehension could be improved by
simpler, clearer instructions. See Kelly & Wendt, supra note 10, at 612-16.
67. Id. at 592-93.
68. Id. at 622.
69. See id. at 595-97.
70. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856).
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sonable" care and the existence or nonexistence of supplementary
instructions elaborating the basic definition in specific circumstances.7' However, they eventually focus on the central or "focal"
concept that seems to underlie all of the instructions: the concept of
"ordinary care" that is defined as "the conduct of the reasonably
careful or reasonably prudent person.""2 They then contrast this
central concept with five different academic conceptions, the first two
of which are also discussed by Gilles in his contribution to this symposium.
The first academic conception is the "(significant) foreseeable
risk" standard, as suggested by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
others. Kelley and Wendt dismiss this standard on the grounds that
most instructions fail to explicitly mention the foreseeable risk issue
and those that do mention it do not treat is as the sole criterion for
negligence but rather also focus on the lack of ordinary or reasonable
care.73 With regard to their first point, I think the foreseeability of
some risk of harm is assumed in all the instructions, since a person
cannot be careful or prudent or reasonable with respect to unforeseeable consequences. Their second point, on the other hand, although
not conclusive seems valid: if the creation of a significant foreseeable
(avoidable) risk were sufficient for a finding of negligence, one would
certainly expect a clearer statement of this in the jury instructions.
The second academic conception of negligence is the Hand formula's aggregate-risk-utility test. Kelley and Wendt echo others who
have argued that jurors are not likely to interpret the typical "reasonably prudent" or "reasonably careful" person instruction as an
invitation to engage in cost-benefit analysis, and that if such an
interpretation were intended one would expect an explicit costbenefit instruction. 4 Kelley and Wendt note that only Louisiana's
71. See Kelley & Wendt. supra note 10, at 617.
72. See id. at 617-18. They identify Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837), as the
focal case from which all the current instructions are presumed to be ultimately derived. See
Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10. at 617 & n.124.
73. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 591, 618.
74. See id. at 591. 618-19; Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 699-700, 704-06; Gilles.
The Invisible Hand Formula, supra note 10, passim; Green, supra note 9, at 1630-31 & n.118:
Hetcher, supra note 24, at 878 ("One thing is certain; ordinary morality bears little resemblance
to utilitarianism.") (citations omitted); Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts
Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer. 26 GA. L. REV. 725. 732-36 (1992). Gilles.
who believes that jurors should be given some version of a cost-benefit instruction, has argued
that judges' general refusal to give such instructions, which was demonstrated most dramatically
by the non-use and eventual elimination of a California risk-utility pattern jury instruction, is
not based on disagreement with the Hand formula's aggregate-risk-utility test but rather on
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pattern jury instructions contain an explicit cost-benefit instruction,
which however is only an optional instruction that may be given to
elaborate the basic "ordinarily prudent person" standard, 75 which is
'76
also better stated as the conduct of a "person of ordinary prudence.
Moreover, even if the instruction is given, it makes the cost-benefit
analysis optional with the jury and, contrary to the draft Restatement
Third,7 7 emphasizes consideration of the "importance to society" of
the defendant's conduct: "you may weigh the likelihood that someone
might have been injured and the seriousness of that injury against the
importance to society of what the defendant was doing and the advis-

ability of the way in which he was doing

it."78

Although it is not noted by Kelley and Wendt, the authors of the
draft Restatement Third would interpret language in a number of the
states' instructions, which declares that the amount of care exercised
should be commensurate with the degree of foreseeable risk or
danger,79 as essentially incorporating the Hand formula's aggregaterisk-utility test. 80 However, as Gilles correctly points out and as
Kelley and Wendt assume, such language does not necessarily implicate the Hand-formula test but rather is a commonsense, simple idea
that would enter into any test of negligence: ordinarily, the greater
the danger, the greater is the need to take care.81
Kelley and Wendt combine their discussion of the third, fourth,
and fifth academic conceptions of negligence. The third conception,
which they attribute to Catharine Wells, treats a person's conduct as
negligent if it was "morally wrong according to the prevailing community moral values. 8' 2 The fourth conception is Heidi Feldman's
concerns about drafting comprehensible instructions, jury nullification, and invading the
province of the jury. See Gilles, supra, at 1041-52: Gilles, Hand Formula Balancing,supra note
7, at 856-61. New Mexico incorporates language in its instructions that, while open to differing
interpretations, reflects a version of the "single owner heuristic" that Gilles advocates. See
Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 599. 1 discuss Gilles's arguments in Wright, Justice and
Reasonable Care, supra note 5, at pt. V.
75. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 600, 620.
76. 18 H. ALTON JOHNSON, III, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3.01 (1994 & Supp. 2001): see Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, app. at 645.
77. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
78. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 600 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
79. See id. at 598, 605-06.
80. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. d at 57, 62.
81. See Gilles, English Negligence Law, supra note 9, at 503-04 n.38, 508-09; Gilles, The
Invisible Hand Formula,supra note 10, at 1017-18 n.6; Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 598.
82. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 591-92 (citing Catharine Wells, Tort Law as
Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348,
2402-13 (1990)).
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"virtue ethics" theory, which makes the standard of care what a
hypothetical person with the virtues of reasonableness, prudence, and
carefulness would have done in the circumstances that existed. 3 The
fifth conception is Kelley's own theory, which makes the standard of
care depend on the community's preexisting specific safety conventions 4 Assuming that these conceptions of negligence are the only
three theories left standing, Kelley and Wendt pose the contest
among them as boiling down to whether the states' pattern jury
instructions, which generally focus on the "ordinary care" of a "reasonably prudent person," are asking the jury to make a moral or a
social judgment. Do the instructions ask the jury to make a moral
judgment about the defendant's conduct based on the community's
moral values or based on the virtuous or nonvirtuous nature of the
defendant's conduct, or do they rather ask the jury to determine
whether there was an applicable preexisting community safety
convention with which the defendant failed to comply?85
Kelley and Wendt argue for the latter interpretation. They note
that although Feldman's virtue ethics might seem to be a plausible
interpretation given its focus on the virtues of reasonableness, prudence, and carefulness-words that are featured in the pattern jury
instructions-these words function in the pattern jury instructions
(and in judicial opinions) to specify an objective standard of ordinary
or reasonable prudence or care, which if not complied with will result
in a finding of negligence even if the person exercised her best
virtuous efforts to behave prudently and carefully."' In other words,
negligence liability, like tort liability overall, is a matter of objective
justice or right, rather than a matter of subjective virtue.,7 The same
argument applies even to the virtue of justice, as Kelley and Wendt
seem to state: from the standpoint of legal liability, of justice and
right, what matters is not whether one is a just person-i.e., acts with
the ethically proper just motives or disposition-but rather whether
one simply does what is just, by complying with the objectively

83. Id. at 592 (citing Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000)).
84. Id. (citing JULES L. COLEMAN. RISKS AND WRONGS 358-59 (1992); Patrick J. Kelley,
Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 315 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 781 (1987)); see id. at 620-21.
85. See id. at 620-21.
86. Id. at 621-22.
87. See Wright, Standardsof Care.supra note 12, at 258-59.
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specified right standards of conduct, regardless of one's motives for
doing so.'
However, it seems to me that Kelley and Wendt go too far in
claiming that neither the pattern jury instructions nor negligence
liability call for any sort of moral judgment-that the standard being
applied is social in nature, based simply on preexisting community
conventions, and makes no reference to fault, improper conduct, or
right or wrong. 9 Although the phrases "ordinary care" and "reasonably prudent" do not ask for judgments regarding actors' virtuous
disposition, they do invoke notions of morally proper conduct,
objective right and wrong ("legal fault" or moral responsibility rather
than moral fault), and justice. So Wells's conception of conduct being
negligent if it was "morally wrong according to the prevailing community moral values,"' " interpreted as referring to objectively specified morally proper conduct rather than ethically proper subjective
dispositions for conduct, seems at least as plausible, indeed more
plausible, than Kelley's conception of conduct being negligent if and
only if it fails to conform to some preexisting community safety
convention.
The notion of a collection of preexisting specific
community
safety
conventions,
sufficiently
detailed
and
comprehensive to resolve the negligence issue for any accident that
might happen to arise, seems highly implausible. Yet, apparently, if
there is no applicable preexisting community safety convention, a
person cannot be held negligent no matter how unsafe her conduct
may have been. In addition, the community safety conventions,
which are merely conventional customs (if acted upon), may well fail
to comply with what would be deemed reasonably prudent conduct.
For example, there may be a custom or practice in the community of
driving down Main Street drunk on Friday night, of jaywalking, of
speeding, of running red lights, and so forth.
Yet I think Kelley and Wendt are right to object to the "freefloating" moral judgments implicit in Wells's reference to "the
community's prevailing moral values." 9' Such prevailing moral values
in a particular community may be just as objectionable, just as imprudent or disrespectful of the rights of others, as Kelley's and Wendt's
88.
note 25,
89.
90.
91.

See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10. at 621-22: Wright, The Principles of Justice,supra
at 1875-83.
See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 10, at 620-21.
See text accompanying note 82 supra.
See Kelley & Wendt. supra note 10, at 620-21.
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community customs or practices-indeed, they are likely to go handin-hand. Both standards are "free floating" in the sense that they are
not anchored in the law and its underpinning principles of justice. We
want juries to invoke those abiding principles of justice, as embedded
and elaborated in the law, rather than the particular community's
currently prevailing moral values, customs, or practices. 9 And there
is evidence, discussed by Kelley and Wendt, that jurors do indeed try
93
to do "total justice" within the framework of the judge's instructions.
IV. RON ALLEN AND Ross ROSENBERG: AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE
CASES

Ron Allen and Ross Rosenberg employ a number of different
methods to investigate the extent to which federal and state courts in
the United States actually employ the Hand formula's aggregate-riskutility test, especially in the marginal, quantitative form of analysis
required for a true determination of economic efficiency, but also in a
94
less rigorous, rough, utilitarian form. They point out, as others have,
that the efficiency interpretation of the aggregate-risk-utility test is
doomed from the start by courts' and juries' (or anyone's) obvious
inability, admitted even by the proponents of the aggregate-riskutility test, to quantitatively measure and compare all (or any) of the
many relevant risks and utilities in any particular situation.95
They also reiterate that the aggregate-risk-utility test is almost
completely absent in jury instructions. 96 However, they assume that
the states' pattern jury instructions reflect the "widespread" and
"near universal" acceptance of the first and second Restatements'
definition of negligent conduct. 97 They apparently have in mind the
"reasonable person" language in the prior Restatements (which, as
Kelley and Wendt point out, does not appear in the pattern jury
instructions, which instead generally refer to the "reasonably prudent
person" or some variation thereof), 9 rather than the explicit riskutility balancing definition of reasonable care in Restatement section
92. See

Richard W. Wright,

Principled Adjudication:

Tort Law

and Beyond, 7

CANTERBURY L. REV. 265,269-74 (1999).

93. See Kelley and Wendt, supra note 10, at 614-16 (discussing NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL
BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000)).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 250-52.
See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 701-04, 708.
See id. at 704-06.
See id. at 701 n.64, 706 n.82 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
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291. 99 Yet it is the latter, risk-utility balancing definition that is
assumed to be widely accepted by the courts in the article by Gilles
that they cite.""'

While acknowledging that "the reasonability standard of the
First and Second Restatements explicitly asks courts to balance risk
against harm," Allen and Rosenberg note that the prior

Restatements' "risk-utility test is clearly meant to be an aspect of the
reasonable person standard, rather than a replacement for it."",' The
draft Restatement Third has indeed been criticized by many,

including Gilles, for eliminating the prior Restatements' discussions
of the reasonable-person

aspect of the negligence standard.Y' 2

However, the reasonable-person sections in the prior Restatements
focus on the objective versus subjective nature of the negligence
standard 03 (a critical aspect of the negligence standard that is at best
buried, and at times even implicitly denied, in the draft Restatement

Third), 1"' rather than the substantive criteria of "reasonable care,"
which are defined exclusively in section 291.105
99. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
100. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 706 n.82 (citing Gilles, Hand Formula
Balancing, supra note 7); Gilles, supra, at 815-16; see also Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula,
supra note 10, at 1015-16 & nn.4-5.
101. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 696 (quoting Gilles, Hand Formula
Balancing,supra note 7, at 824).
102. See Gilles, Hand Formula Balancing,supra note 7, at 822-25, 849-54.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283-283 C, 289-290 (1965).
104. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. g, at 45 ("[T]o establish the
actor's negligence.., the likelihood [of harm] must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of the
conduct.") (emphasis added): id. § 3 cmt. k, at 50 ("[Tlhe balancing approach to negligence
tends to assume that the actor is aware of[the] risk, but has tolerated [the] risk on account of the
burdens involved by risk-prevention measures.") (emphasis added). But see id. at 51 ("[Tlhe
function of the jury is to consider what the reasonably careful person would have done in the
particular factual situation.... The reasonably careful person is infallible in a way that ordinary
people are not."); id. § 12 cmt. b (noting and discussing the objective perspective). Unlike the
prior Restatements, there is no explicit reference to the usual objective perspective for
defendants in the blackletter sections of the draft Restatement Third; it is at best implied in
sections 11 and 12. For a discussion of the varying perspectives applied to defendants and
plaintiffs in different types of situations, see Wright, Standardsof Care,supra note 12, at 257-59,
265-66, 271-74; text accompanying notes 164-229 infra.
105. Allen and Rosenberg state that the "negligence section of the proposed draft of the
Third Restatement of Torts includes a strongly worded, explicit endorsement of the Hand
formula [that] constitutes a significant departure from the negligence section of the Second
Restatement of Torts." Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 707. They cite section 283 of the
Restatement Second, which states the objective "reasonable person" aspect of the negligence
standard, rather than section 291, which states the substantive criteria of reasonable care, and
they quote the blackletter definition of negligence in the draft Restatement Third, which seems
to retreat from the risk-utility balancing test in the prior Restatements by describing the Hand
formula factors as "primary" (not exclusive) factors that are not explicitly incorporated into a
balancing formula. See id. at 707 & n.86. But see id. at 707 (noting "the temporizing of the
Third Restatement[:] the Hand formula is a primary factor, but certainly not an exclusive
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Allen and Rosenberg ran a computerized search of court references to the "Hand formula," "Hand test," or the Carroll Towing
case in which Judge Hand set forth the "Hand formula."1''
They
found approximately 30 federal court of appeals cases (15 of which
were from the Seventh Circuit after the arrival of Judge Posner, the
leading proponent of the Hand formula) and 27 state court cases (21
of which were from a single state, Louisiana) that referred to the
Hand formula. Citations to the Carroll Towing case were more
numerous but still quite low: one time by the United States Supreme
Court, approximately 50 times by federal courts of appeals, 38 times
by federal district courts, and 47 times by state courts.10 7 They do not
indicate whether the citations to Carroll Towing include only those
that refer to Hand's formulation of the negligence standard, nor how
many of the cases that cite Carroll Towing overlap those that explicitly referred to the "Hand formula" or "Hand test."
The numbers that Allen and Rosenberg report are comparable
to those that I came up with when I ran similar computerized searches
in 1994 of all federal and state cases in the Westlaw database from
1945 through May 1994. I found only 46 state cases and only 72
federal cases that had cited Carroll Towing or explicitly referred to
the "Hand formula" during the almost 50 years since Carroll Towing
was decided in 1947. Almost all of the state cases were decided
during the last ten years of the study period. Only three states had
more than 2 cases: Louisiana (14, almost one-third of the total 46
cases), Idaho (4), and New Jersey (4). Thirty states had no cases;
twelve (including the District of Columbia) had 1; and six had 2. Of
the 72 federal cases, 13 were from the Second Circuit, the circuit in
which Carroll Towing was decided. All but one of the Second Circuit
cases were decided before 1960 and did not deal with the Hand
formula issue, but rather cited Carroll Towing for unrelated issues.
Of the remaining 59 federal cases, all but a handful were decided
one."). It is the comments in the draft Restatement Third that reaffirm the risk-utility balancing
formula in the prior Restatements and recast it as a reductionist cost-benefit test. See text
accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
107. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 701. They also Shepardized the "related"
T.J. Hooper decision, which they report has been cited 8 times by the Supreme Court, 72 times
by federal courts of appeals, 67 times by federal district courts, 185 times by state courts, and
323 times in law reviews, which they conclude "are not the numbers of a revolutionary or pathbreaking decision." See id. at 701 & n.68. Hand's opinion in The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d
Cir. 1932), had nothing to do with the definition of negligent conduct, but rather is the leading
case holding that compliance with custom is not conclusive evidence, but rather only some
evidence, of lack of negligence.
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after 1977. About a third (19) of these 59 federal cases came from a
single circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and all but one of these 19 Seventh
Circuit cases were decided after Richard Posner joined the circuit
bench and began expounding the efficiency interpretation of negligence in his opinions.,,,,
In a similar search done at the same time (in 1994) of all federal
and state cases in the Westlaw database both before and after 1945,
supplemented by the citation lists in the Restatement Appendices, I
found only 109 state cases and only 27 federal cases that had cited
Restatement section 291 in the sixty years since Restatement section
291 was adopted in 1934. Of the 109 state cases, many were decided
before 1970. Only 12 states had more than two cases: Louisiana (17),
California (13, only 3 after 1967), Pennsylvania (8, none since 1975
and all but one before 1957), Wisconsin (7, only 4 since 1966, none
since 1980), New Jersey (6, only 1 after 1965, and that one was critical
of cost-benefit analysis), New York (6, only 3 after 1947), Michigan
(5), Georgia (4, only 1 after 1965), Massachusetts (4, all prior to
1942), Oregon (4, none since 1981), Washington (4, none since 1959),
and Missouri (3 cases, clustered between 1981 and 1983). Twenty
states had no cases; eleven had 1; eight (including the District of
Columbia) had 2.1("
The fact that these cases cited Carroll Towing, the "Hand formula," or Restatement section 291 does not necessarily imply that
they addressed the negligent-conduct issue or, if they did, that they
applied the aggregate-risk-utility test to resolve that issue. Indeed, a
few of the cases explicitly rejected the aggregate-risk-utility test. For
example, the only Utah case, Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc.,"" that cited
Restatement section 291 rejected the section's apparent aggregaterisk-utility test, stating: "Unreasonable risks are those which society,
in general, considers sufficiently great to demand preventive measures....
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291 and 292 merely
emphasize some factors as important in determining whether a risk is
unreasonable," and upheld a jury instruction that focused on the
acceptability of the risk solely in light of its magnitude."' Similarly,
108. Richard W. Wright, Paper Rules, Real Rules, and Moral Principles: An Empirical
Investigation of the Standards of Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, at 4 (unpublished paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association in Glasgow, Scotland. July
1996) [hereinafter Wright, Paper Rules] (paper on file with author).
109. Id. at 4-5.
110. 744 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
111. Seeid.at 1013.
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the most recent of the two New Hampshire cases, after quoting
Restatement section 291, stated, "More specifically, the issue is
'whether there [was] some probability of harm sufficiently serious
that ordinary men would take precautions to avoid it."'112 In few if
any of the cases was the negligent-conduct issue actually resolved
through application of the aggregate-risk-utility test." 3
The lack of credibility of the draft Restatement Third's claims
that its aggregate-risk-utility "balancing approach to negligence has
been accepted in judicial opinions in a large majority of jurisdictions"
and that "what is of special interest is the inability to identify any
jurisdiction whose cases explicitly (or by clear implication) reject the
balancing approach" is exemplified by its citation of the Wagoner case
(the only Utah case that it cites). The draft Restatement Third cites
Wagoner as a case that allegedly supports the aggregate-risk-utility
test and, moreover, lists Wagoner as one of a handful of cases that
allegedly treat "[t]he balancing approach and the concepts of
reasonable care or the reasonable person... as essentially inter4
changeable.""
Of course, courts may apply an aggregate risk-utility test to determine reasonableness in negligence cases without any citation of
Carroll Towing, the "Hand formula," or Restatement section 291. It
is a much more difficult task to determine the extent to which this
occurs, but I attempted to do so through another study initiated in
1994, which remains uncompleted." 5 I decided to take advantage of
West's key number classification system and devised a (long)
Westlaw search term that included all the Westlaw negligence keys
(under topic 272, negligence) that seem to focus on the substantive
negligence issue: subdivisions 1-55 (acts or omissions constituting
negligence) and 65-88 (contributory negligence by persons injured in

112. Morin v. Manchester Housing Auth., 195 A.2d 243, 245 (N.H. 1963).
113. See text accompanying notes 115-57 infra.
114. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. d, Reporters' Note, at 55, 56,
59; cf. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula,supra note 10, at 1016 n.5 (finding, in a computerized
search, "no cases directly rejecting Hand Formula negligence, although one appellate court
affirmed the trial judge's refusal to give a risk-utility instruction defining unreasonable risk on
grounds that arguably relegate the Hand Formula factors to a limited doctrinal role. See
Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc., 744 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)."). The late reporter for
the draft Restatement Third, Gary Schwartz, persisted in citing the Wagoner case despite being
informed at meetings of the members' consultative group and at the annual meeting that it was
miscited.
115. The following discussion of this study and its initial results are taken from Wright,
Paper Rules, supra note 108, at 5-11.

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:425

general).116 This key number search, applied to all the cases in the
relevant Westlaw databases from 1945 through 1992, inclusive,
retrieved almost 21,000 state cases (from the Allstates database) and
almost 3,000 federal cases (from the Allfeds database). These cases
constituted the negligent-conduct database for further analysis." 7
After considerable trial and error, a search query was constructed to retrieve from the negligent-conduct database as many as
possible of the cases that mention both risk and utility while addressing the negligent-conduct issue, and which thus might be engaged in
the utilitarian balancing of aggregate risks and utilities, while avoiding
retrieving reams of spurious or "garbage" matches (e.g., "John Risk
vs. Utility Co."). Based on analysis of samples of the complete
negligent-conduct database, the constructed search query seemed to
retrieve the vast majority of the relevant cases while minimizing (but
not avoiding) the retrieval of irrelevant cases. 118 Date limits were
added to the search query to retrieve cases separately for each
calendar year from 1945 through 1992.
Out of the almost 24,000 case opinions classified under the relevant negligent-conduct key numbers from 1945 through 1992, less
than 7 percent had language matching the risk-and-utility search
query. The percentages were generally below 5 percent until the mid1970s, 5-10 percent until the early 1980s (federal cases) or mid-1980s
(state cases), and 10-15 percent through 1992. Each of the querymatch cases had to be read and analyzed to determine whether the
query match was based on language that is relevant (e.g., "the defendant's burden of taking precautions") or spurious (e.g., "the donkey
carried a heavy burden"). If the language was relevant, it had to be
determined whether there was some sort of actual balancing or
comparison of risk against utility to determine the reasonableness of a
116. 1 excluded subdivisions 56-64 (proximate cause), 89-93 (imputed negligence), 97-101
(comparative negligence), 102-143 (negligence actions), and 144 (criminal responsibility). The
keyword search term was "(272K1* 272K2* 272K3* 272K4* 272K7* 272K5 272K6 272K8
272K9 272K50 272K51 272K52 272K53 272K54 272K55 272K65 272K66 272K67 272K68
272K69 272K8" % 272K89)."
117. I discovered, however, that initially West classified cases primarily by the nature of the
activities involved. Thus, for old cases there might not be a negligence topic (272) key number
assigned to a negligence case, but rather a negligence subdivision for an activity-based key
number topic. For example, no negligence topic (272) key number was assigned to Carroll
Towing itself, which rather was classified primarily under admiralty (shipping) key number
topics.
118. The search query was "(risk (probabilit! likelihood/5 harm injur! danger) /15 utility
benefit* burden* cost*)". This might have been marginally improved by, e.g., adding to the
risk list "accident*".
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party's conduct. If there was some sort of balancing or comparison, it
finally had to be determined whether the balancing or comparison
was utilitarian in nature, taking into account all risks and benefits to
everyone (as specified by the aggregate-risk-utility test) or rather was
more limited in terms of, e.g., the benefits taken into account or the
way in which those benefits were taken into account. This timeconsuming analysis was completed, by a research assistant under my
supervision, only for the years 1989 through 1992. The results of his
analysis are included in tables 1 and 2. The last two columns are
labeled "possible balancing" and "possible utilitarian balancing"
because, upon reviewing the research assistant's descriptions of the
cases while preparing this introduction and commentary, I have
doubts about whether many or any of the cases that he listed as
involving balancing (utilitarian or not) actually involve such balancing, rather than mere consideration of the burdens of precaution in a
non-balancing analysis." 9

TABLE

1: NEGLIGENCE

CASES YEAR-BY-YEAR SUMMARY
STATE CASES

YEAR

Total

Query

Relevant

Possible

Possible

Cases

Match

Language

Balancing

Utilitarian
Balancing

No.

Percent

No.

Percent

No.

Percent

No.

Percent

1992

745

103

14%

66

9%

20

3%

7

1%

1991

694

81

12%

52

7%

26

4%

7

1%

1990

580

62

11%

39

7%

18

3%

8

1%

1989

589

67

11%

39

7%

17

3%

10

2%

TOTAL

2608

313

12%

196

8%

81

3%

32

1%

119. See text accompanying notes 135-57 infra.
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2: NEGLIGENCE CASES YEAR-BY-YEAR SUMMARY
FEDERAL CASES

YEAR

Total
Cases

Query
Match

Relevant
Language

Possible
Balancing

No.

Percent

No.

Percent

No.

Percent

Possible
Utilitarian
Balancing
No. Percent

1992

114

11

10%

3

3%

2

2%

2

2%

1991

112

11

10%

7

6%

1

1%

0

0%

1990

94

12

13%

6

6%

3

3%

1

1%

1989

47

5

11%

2

4%

1

2%

1

2%

TOTAL

367

39

11%

18

5%

7

2%

4

1%

As can be seen from tables 1 and 2, around three-eighths of the
state query-matches and over half of the federal query matches were
spurious. Of the query-match cases that had relevant (risk and
utility) language relating to the negligent-conduct issue, only about
two-fifths, comprising only 2 to 4 percent of the total negligence cases
being studied, possibly involved some sort of actual balancing or
comparison of risk and utility to determine reasonableness. Only
about two-fifths of the possible balancing or comparison cases,
comprising only one percent of the total negligence cases being
studied, possibly involved a utilitarian (aggregate-risk-utility) type of
balancing.
Two states, Illinois and Louisiana, produced over half of the 196
state relevant-language cases (Illinois 66, Louisiana 37) and almost
four-fifths of the 71 possible-balancing cases (Illinois 35, Louisiana
20) and the 32 possible-utilitarian-balancing cases (Illinois 14, Louisiana 11). No other state came anywhere near these totals. The courts
in Illinois and Louisiana often use boilerplate risk-utility language to
begin their negligent-conduct analysis. Illinois's conceptually muddled approach incorporates the Hand formula factors (without
identifying them as such, and without necessarily implying any Hand
formula balancing) as boilerplate language in the duty analysis rather
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than the breach-of-duty analysis. In both states, the boilerplate riskutility language often is left behind in the courts' actual analysis of
reasonableness, and the actual result rarely turns on a utilitarian
2
(aggregate-risk-utility) balancing.1 0
Through fortuitous coincidence, Allen and Rosenberg analyzed a
sample of Illinois and Louisiana cases for their article in this symposium that overlaps for one year, 1992, the cases that were analyzed in
my study. Allen and Rosenberg report that their "interest in the
veracity of the economic explanation of negligence was sparked in
part by the notorious and shocking case of Lee v. Chicago Transit
Authority,"1 21 which was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in
December 1992 and which led them to focus their initial study on
Illinois Supreme Court cases decided during the two years surrounding the Lee case.12 2 After describing the facts and holdings of the nine
cases that they found that dealt with the negligent-conduct issue, they
conclude (persuasively based on their exposition) that:
The Illinois [Supreme Court] cases in 1992 and 1993 provide
no support for the economic [aggregate-risk-utility] theory of negligence. The cases do not attempt to impose the economic theory on
the results of verdicts, and the facts of the cases cannot plausibly be
reconciled with the theory, although the cases indicate 1the
23 banal
point that relative costs and benefits are not irrelevancies.
Two of the five 1992 cases-the Lee case and DiBenedetto v.
Flora Township'24-were also turned up by the risk-and-utility search
query in my 1994 study and were classified, consistently with Allen
and Rosenberg's analysis, 25 as involving (at most) "possible balancing," but as clearly not applying the aggregate-risk-utility test. The

120. See text accompanying notes 121-28, 135-57 infra.
121. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 708 (citing Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605
N.E.2d 493 (I11.
1992)). My colleague Ralph Brill, who participated in the appellate litigation in
the Lee case, will be happy to explain to anyone why the result in the Lee case, while clearly
inconsistent with the aggregate-risk-utility test, nevertheless was proper and just rather than
shocking.
122. See id. at 708-09.
123. Id. at 716; see id. at 709-16.
124. 605 N.E.2d 571 (I11.
1992).
125. Allen and Rosenberg note that "the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a jury verdict
for Mr. Lee without anything remotely like an economic cost-benefit analysis. Although it
mentioned some of the economic factors, the court explicitly disregarded the cost to the CTA
rather than attempt to determine relative costs and benefits." Allen & Rosenberg, supra note
30, at 710. Similarly, they note the lack of any "obvious connection to the economic [costbenefit balancing] arguments" in DiBenedetto, in which the holding for the defendant was based
on the court's conclusion that roadside ditches are not meant to be driven in and need not be
made safe for such purposes. See id. at 713.
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other three 1992 cases that Allen and Rosenberg found 2 6 apparently
did not have any references to risk and utility in any of the various
permutations included in my search query. On the other hand, Allen
27
and Rosenberg do not discuss one 1992 Illinois Supreme Court case
that was analyzed in my 1994 study and classified (incorrectly, I now
think) as possibly involving utilitarian balancing.
Allen and Rosenberg carried their study of Illinois Supreme
Court cases eight years further forward, to encompass all the relevant
negligence cases decided between December 1991 and November
2001, inclusive. While not listing or describing these cases individually, they report:
In no case did the Hand formula, or any form of balancing consequences, form the sole basis of the rule or rationale of the case. At
best, the Supreme Court of Illinois balanced the consequences
flowing from the case at hand in the context of a variety of other
prominent facts, including the reasonable person standard, the
relevant precedent, and the expectations of the parties. 12
They contrast the Illinois cases with recent cases decided by the
Louisiana Supreme Court and intermediate appellate courts. Louisiana, they state, "could not be more different from the Illinois
cases, ' ' 12 9 since "the appellate courts in Louisiana have both accepted
the Hand formula as the meaning of negligence and attempted to
employ it directly in their decisions, and it seems that it is the only
state that does so." 30 They treat Louisiana as "the exception that
proves the rule."''

126. See id. at 713-16 (discussing Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Nat'l Adver. Co.,
594 N.E.2d 313 (I11.
1992); Hutchings v. Bauer, 599 N.E.2d 934 (111.
1992); and Wojdyla v. City of
Park Ridge, 592 N.E.2d 1098 (I11.
1992)).
127. Rails v. Village of Glendale Heights, 598 N.E.2d 337 (I11.
1992). Since Allen and
Rosenberg focus solely on Illinois Supreme Court cases, they also do not discuss the 22 Illinois
intermediate appellate court cases decided in 1992 that were found to have relevant risk and
utility language in my 1994 study, four of which (Benjamin v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 588 N.E,2d 378 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); Nat'l Bank of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 600 N.E.2d 1275 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992): Rodriguez v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 593 N.E.2d
597 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); Sparrow v. Talman Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 592 N.E.2d 363 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992)) were classified as involving possible non-utilitarian balancing and three of
which (Klikas v. Hanover Square Condo. Ass'n, 608 N.E.2d 541 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); McDermott
v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 607 N.E.2d 1271 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); Stemen v. Avon Prods., Inc., 599
N.E.2d 1140 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992)) were classified as involving possible utilitarian balancing. As I
previously stated in the text, I now doubt that the results in any of these cases actually were
based or depended on utilitarian (aggregate-risk-utility) balancing.
128. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 709 n.93; see id.at 717.
129. Id. at 717.
130. Id. at 709.
131. Id. at 719.
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Louisiana, as a singular exception, would support the claim that
American courts in general have not accepted and do not attempt to
apply the Hand formula's aggregate-risk-utility test to resolve the
negligent-conduct issue. However, even as a singular exception it
would contradict their basic hypothesis: that issues such as the
negligent-conduct issue, which are "ambiguous" (not completely
specified in advance in terms of the proper result in specific
situations), "unpredictable" (computationally intractable), and
amenable to resolution through common sense (rather than requiring
special expertise), are by their very nature not resolvable by general
"top-down" theories of morality or law."' For, if it is true, as they
state, that the Louisiana experience not only "indicates that courts
can, indeed, attempt to mold negligence cases into the economic
form,"' 33 but also that "the appellate courts in Louisiana routinely
134
apply the Hand formula" to resolve the negligent-conduct issue,
then-contrary to their basic hypothesis-issues such as the
negligent-conduct issue obviously can be resolved by resort to general
theories of morality and law.
It is clear that the Louisiana courts (which clearly have been
influenced-and misled-by academic theory13) have attempted to
employ the Hand formula's aggregate-risk-utility test to resolve
negligent-conduct issues. However, the decisions by the Louisiana
courts are not actually based on risk-utility balancing. Rather, as with
the Illinois courts' boilerplate references to the Hand formula factors
when discussing the duty issue, the references to the Hand formula in
the Louisiana cases are mere window-dressing, with the cases actually
being decided, explicitly or implicitly, on grounds that are quite
distinct from the Hand formula.

132. See id. at 706-07; text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
133. Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 709 (emphasis added); see id. at 719 ("[C]ourts
are quite competent to attempt to apply the Hand formula analysis if they choose to do so. The
Louisiana courts do so as directed by their supreme court.") (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 718 (emphasis added); see id. at 690 ("The significance of the Louisiana cases is
that they show judges are capable of employing the economic approach directly, thus suggesting
that those who do not - the rest of the nation, basically - are doing so because of choice rather
than necessity.").
135. See, e.g., Levi v. S.W. La. Elec. Membership Coop., 542 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (La. 1989)
(adopting Judge Learned Hand's verbal formulation of the aggregate-risk-utility test in Conway
v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), and citing, inter alia, Posner, supra note 8; Guido
Calabresi & Jon Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. REV. 1055
(1972); HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, § 16.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291
(1965)); Dobson v. La. Power & Light Co., 567 So. 2d 569, 574-75 (La. 1990) (citing the same
sources plus others and referring for the first time to the "Hand formula" or "Hand test").
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For example, in Dobson v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,136 the
Louisiana Supreme Court case that is quoted extensively by Allen
and Rosenberg and apparently assumed by them as well as the
reporters for the draft Restatement Third to be an example of the use
of the Hand formula,'37 the court's holdings are not based on and
cannot be explained by any aggregate-risk-utility analysis, but rather
are based on the traditional high standard of care that is imposed on
the operators of dangerous instrumentalities regardless of the relative
risks, utilities, costs, and benefits in the particular situation.
The plaintiffs' decedent, Dwane Dobson, had been hired by Mrs.
Davidge to remove a spindly pine tree in the rear of her lot adjacent
to the defendant's power line right of way. The tree overhung the
defendant's uninsulated high voltage (8,000 volt) distribution line.
The 315-foot long distribution line, which served an apartment
complex and carried much higher voltage than a premises service line,
was partly buried but was above ground behind Mrs. Davidge's lot.
Mrs. Davidge had complained to the defendant many times about
hazards created by the distribution line, including transformers
blowing up and limbs falling onto the wires and causing fires. She had
asked the defendant to remove the tree, but it had refused to do so
since the tree's base was on her property. Nor did the defendant send
anyone to inspect the tree. At the time it had insufficient funds to
properly trim trees in its rights of ways in the area, and it had no
38
regular inspection team or program.
Dobson was electrocuted while taking down the tree when a
safety rope, which he had reinforced with a metal wire to prevent the
rope from being cut by his chain saw, contacted the distribution line.
Dobson had started his tree trimming service only a few months
earlier, had no formal training, and was learning by experience and by
talking with other local tree trimmers. The trial judge found that, as a
result of Dobson's previous damaging of a single-residence service
line, a representative of the defendant had informed him that the
defendant would lower such service lines to facilitate tree trimming
and otherwise generally assist him in the future, but had not informed
him that the distribution lines could also be lowered or de-energized
or that the distribution lines, unlike the insulated service lines which
136.
137.
Allen &
138.

567 So. 2d 569 (La. 1990).
See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. d, Reporters' Note, at 56;
Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 717-18.
Dobson, 567 So. 2d at 570-72.
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were similar in appearance, were uninsulated. Dobson had had a
service line lowered the day before, but had not requested the defendant to lower the major distribution line serving the apartment
complex. The trial judge found that Dobson was unaware that the
139
distribution line was uninsulated or that it could have been lowered.
Applying Louisiana's comparative responsibility statute, the trial
judge found Dobson free of fault but found the defendant negligently
"failed to perform adequate inspections of its electric lines, trim or
remove the tree or trees creating the hazard, provide insulated
covering of dangerous parts of the lines,.., place adequate warnings
of the high voltage electricity on or near its uncovered wires [or] warn
Dobson of the dangers associated with its high voltage distribution
lines." 4 The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that Dobson
had been contributorily negligent and reducing the plaintiffs' recovery by 70 percent. 41 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the
court of appeals' conclusions that the defendant was negligent and
that Dobson was contributorily negligent, stating that a reasonable
person in modern America should know that any electrical line could
be dangerous and that a tree trimmer "isunder a peculiar obligation
to acquire the knowledge and ability required to identify uninsulated
power lines and to take precautions against the extreme dangers they
pose.' 14 Although later in its opinion the court reiterated the current
Louisiana boilerplate language-that the reasonableness of a risk is
determined through Hand's risk-benefit balancing test' 43 -the court
did not apply or even refer to the Hand formula when previously
reaching its legal conclusions regarding the negligence of Dobson and
the defendant.
The court purported to use the Hand formula to measure and
compare the parties' comparative negligence, asserting that "[tihe
Hand formula provides a method for accommodating and weighing
all of [the factors in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act] including
the more subjective factors, such as the existence of an emergency, a
party's capacity, or his awareness of the risk."' 44 The court assessed
60 percent of the comparative responsibility to the defendant and 40
139. Id.
140. Id. at 571.
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 573-74 (citations omitted).
143. Id.at 574-75 (citations omitted). The court quoted Hand's verbal formulation of the
test in Conway v. O'Brien, 111F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). See note 135 supra.
144. 567 So. 2d at 575 (citation omitted).
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percent to Dobson "in order to achieve substantial justice in this
case.' ' 45 Even though the defendant's failure to inspect its lines, trim
trees, insulate wires, post warnings, and so forth endangered multiple
persons and property while Dobson's conduct endangered only
himself, the court did not attempt to assess or even acknowledge the
substantial difference in the risks created by the defendant and
Dobson, but rather stated that it would concentrate on the precaution
costs since "the magnitude of the danger caused by the conduct of
either Dobson or LP & L was extreme.' '

46

Similarly, ignoring the

previously found fact that the costs of inspection and trimming were
so substantial that they exceeded the defendant's available funds, the
court concluded, without any attempt to assess the actual costs, that
"the power company had a number of relatively inexpensive, efficacious precautions available to it, e.g., inspection, maintenance, partial
insulation, public education and visible warnings.' '1

7

The court

added:
Moreover, there was one particularly effective way in which LP &
L could have eliminated the risk at little or no cost-by explicitly
warning Dobson about the uninsulated high voltage distribution
lines and telling him how to distinguish them from the insulated
dwelling service lines. On the other hand, the cost to Dobson, who
was ignorant of the characteristics of the uninsulated distribution
lines and therefore unaware of their special danger, exceeded the
cost to a person with superior capacity and knowledge. An actor
with "inferior" capacity to avoid harm must expend more effort to
avoid a danger than need a person with "superior" ability. A person about to cause injury inadvertently must expend much more effort to avoid the danger than need one who is at least aware of the
danger involved. For this reason courts have traditionally cited
"awareness of danger" as a factor distinguishing mere negligence
from the higher state of culpability commonly
known as "reckless48
ness" or "willful and wanton conduct."'
The traditional distinction between mere inadvertence and disregard of a known risk, upon which the court relies, has a moral rather
than a cost basis. The court's attempt to apply the distinction based
on a difference in costs merely asserted that the distinction existed in
this case and assumed rather than demonstrated a difference in costs.
How costly would it have been for Dobson to inquire about the risks
related to distribution lines (if indeed he was unaware of the risks),
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id. (citations omitted).
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which are generally assumed to be high-voltage and quite dangerous?
Moreover, the court's apparent assumption that an explicit warning to
Dobson would have eliminated the risk is unsupported, even
considering only the risk to Dobson and his workers, rather than to
others in the area also put at risk. As the dissenting justices observed,
it is at least equally arguable that Dobson, being on the scene and
aware of the distribution line, was more aware of the specific risk
than the defendant and could more cheaply have avoided it.
Justice Cole, dissenting, apparently would have absolved the defendant of any responsibility. He argued that the defendant had
sufficiently warned Dobson, that Dobson was aware of the danger
from any electrical wire, and that Dobson could easily have avoided
the injury by adopting any one of a number of accepted precautions,
including climbing on the side of the tree away from the wire, not
putting a metal wire in his safety line, or making a brief telephone call
to the defendant's service representative.149 Justice Pro Tempore
Shortess, also dissenting, agreed with the court of appeals' assessment
of comparative responsibility: "Even a neophyte tree trimmer should
have known that the use of a steel-and nylon-made safety line was
extremely dangerous, especially when working near electric lines."',,
Neither justice made any attempt to engage in a comparative analysis
of risks, utilities, costs, or benefits. Justice Hall, dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing, also agreed with the court of
appeals' assessment of comparative responsibility. Although he
agreed that "[t]he 'Hand formula' is a useful tool as is the ...Uniform Act list of factors in determining relative degrees of fault," he
argued that "the majority opinion in this case miscalculates and gives
too much weight to the cost side of the formula and reverses the
superior-inferior roles of the actors in the immediate events which
resulted in this accident." 5 '
Justice Lemmon, concurring only in the result, stated that he disagreed with the use of the Hand formula to assess comparative fault
since he believed that it "may be more restrictive or confusing and
less useful to juries" than the Uniform Comparative Fault Act factors
in providing "the necessary balancing and flexibility for quantifying
each party's deviation from the appropriate standard of care."' 52 The
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 577, 578, 581.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id. at 577.
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various justices' fumblings with the Hand formula factors in this case,
none of which come close to any actual risk-utility analysis, comparative or otherwise, amply bear out Justice Lemmon's concern.
In the only other Louisiana case that Allen and Rosenberg discuss, Pinsouneaultv. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 53 the
intermediate appellate court merely cites the Hand formula boilerplate and then conclusorily announces:
In the present case, where foreseeability of armed robbery at
the night depository has been established, the likelihood that the
bank's failure to provide security would lead to the shooting death
of a night deposit patron far outweighs the cost of installing [and
maintaining and monitoring?] surveillance cameras, cutting down
shrubbery, upgrading lighting and/or extending a fence .... 154
Note the lack of any analysis of risks, utilities, costs or benefits.
Despite the Hand formula window-dressing, the requirement of more
precaution by the bank is not based on any Hand formula balancing
of risks and utilities, but rather on an implicit non-balancing,
prohibitive-cost assessment of the extent of care owed by a bank to its
customers given a significant foreseeable risk.
Dobson was one of the 37 Louisiana cases decided between 1989
and 1992, inclusive, that were identified in my 1994 study as having
employed risk-and-utility language in relation to the negligentconduct issue. My research assistant, under my guidance, classified 20
of the 37 cases as engaging in some form of risk-utility "balancing"
and 14 of those cases, including Dobson, as engaging in "utilitarian
balancing." In preparing this article, I have reviewed the 37 cases and
determined that, while many of them, like Dobson, recited boilerplate
risk-utility balancing language, none of them actually engaged in
aggregate-risk-utility balancing. At most, they engaged in a nonbalancing consideration of prohibitive-cost, according to which
defendants who put others at risk are deemed negligent unless the
risk is not too serious, necessary for the obtaining of some benefit
desired by those being put at risk or by everyone in society rather
than merely a private benefit to the defendant, reduced to the maximum extent feasible without significantly impairing the desired
benefit, and significantly outweighed by the desired benefit.'55

153. 738 So. 2d 172 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (quoted in Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at
718-19).
154. Id. at 187-88.
155. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.

2002] NEGLIGENCE IN THE COURTS: INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

463

In fact, many of the 37 Louisiana cases, including many of those
improperly classified in my 1994 study as having engaged in utilitarian
balancing, contained explicit language rejecting reductionist
aggregate-risk-utility balancing and insisting that proper resolution of
the "unreasonable risk" issue, in both ordinary negligence cases and
cases involving Louisiana's so-called "strict liability" for injuries
caused by "things,"'5 6 depends ultimately on considerations of justice
and the respective rights positions of the defendant and the plaintiff.
For example, in a case decided a year after Dobson, which also was
misclassified in my 1994 study as being based on utilitarian aggregaterisk-utility balancing, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Although courts, including this court, have described the unreasonable risk of harm criterion [for "strict liability" for things] as requiring the court to balance the likelihood and magnitude of harm
against the utility of the thing, the balancing test required by the
unreasonable risk of harm criterion does not lend itself well to such
neat, mathematical formulations. In addition to the likelihood and
magnitude of the risk and the utility of the thing, the [court] should
consider a broad range of social, economic, and moral factors....
In essence, the unreasonable risk of harm analysis is similar to
the duty-risk analysis which is performed in a negligence case....
Just as in a negligence analysis... [t]he court must carefully consider all the circumstances surrounding the particular accident under review to determine whether allowing recovery to the
particular plaintiff involved, for damages occurring in the particular
manner in which the plaintiff was injured, is desirable from the
standpoint of justice and the social utility of the conduct of the respective parties.'57
156. A great many of the 37 Louisiana cases were such so-called "strict liability" cases,
which are treated by the Louisiana courts the same as "traditional" negligence cases, except for
imputed knowledge of the particular condition of the "thing":
The unreasonable risk of harm criterion ... is not a simple rule of law which may
[It is the judge's] duty to decide
be applied mechanically to the facts of every case ....
which risks are encompassed by the codal [Louisiana civil code] obligations from a
standpoint of justice and social utility.
Although a judge may be constrained by the concrete problem before him and the
ambit of his limited authority, he nevertheless must consider the moral, social, and
economic values as well as the idea of justice in reaching an intelligent and responsible
decision. The judicial process involved in deciding whether a risk is unreasonable
under Art. 2317 is similar to that employed in determining whether a risk is
unreasonable in a traditional negligence problem, except that a landowner is not
absolved from strict liability by a showing of ignorance of the condition or by
circumstances that the defect could not easily be detected.
Maples v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 567 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1990); accord,
Alexander v. City of Lafayette, 584 So. 2d 327, 328 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
157. Oster v. La. Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (La. 1991); accord, Sistler
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106, 1112-13 (La. 1990) ("Reasonableness of the risk is
determined by balancing the probability and magnitude of the risk against the utility of the
thing. The unreasonable risk criterion cannot be applied mechanically. This criterion is a

464

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:425

Allen and Rosenberg should be pleased to discover that the

Louisiana courts do not actually apply an economic (or any other)
aggregate-risk-utility test, but rather explicitly reject reductionist
aggregate-risk-utility balancing and instead insist that proper resolu-

tion of the "unreasonable risk" issue, in both "traditional" negligence
cases and cases involving so-called "strict" liability for things, depends
ultimately on considerations of justice and the respective rights
positions of the defendant and the plaintiff. Their basic hypothesis is
not contradicted by the Louisiana cases, at least with respect to the
economic-efficiency theory of negligence liability. However, the

Louisiana judges explicitly invoke considerations of justice and rights,
and those considerations, rather than the risk-utility-balancing
boilerplate window-dressing, seem to underlie and explain their
decisions. Allen and Rosenberg's basic hypothesis thus still may be
(and I think is) false. As they themselves admit, it may well be that
there is no fundamental incompatibility between issues like the
negligent-conduct issue and "top-down" theorizing in general, but

rather that there is merely an incompatibility between the negligentconduct issue and theories such as the economic-efficiency theory
that misconceive and are fundamentally in conflict with the basic
principles that underlie negligence liability (and law in general).51
The only evidence that Allen and Rosenberg offer to support
their claim that interactive justice principles are not employed by the

courts is their assumption that jury instructions on the negligentconduct issue have remained essentially unchanged over the last
concept employed to symbolize the judicial process of deciding which risks are encompassed by
the codal obligations from the standpoint of justice and social utility. Reaching an intelligent
and responsible decision of whether a risk is unreasonable involves consideration of moral,
social and economic values as well as the ideal of justice."). Jones v. Gillen, 564 So. 2d 1274 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (same); Bell v. State, 553 So. 2d 902 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (same); see Henshaw v.
Audubon Park Comm'n. 605 So. 2d 640, 641 (La. Ct. App. 1992) ("We must consider the moral,
social and economic values.... The activities of man for which he may be ["strictly" liable] are
to be determined after a study of the law and customs, a balancing of claims and interests, a
weighing of the risk and the gravity of the harm, and a consideration of individual and societal
rights and obligations."); Fox v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 605 So. 2d 643, 645 (La. Ct. App.
1992) ("A trial judge, in making her determination of whether the risk of harm was
unreasonable, should weigh certain considerations including the gravity of the risk and the
harm, the individual and societal rights and obligations, and the social utility involved.");
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. City of New Orleans, 585 So. 2d 643, 646 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (same);
Socorro v. Orleans Levee Bd., 561 So. 2d 739, 750 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that, in "strict
liability" or traditional negligence actions, "the court must balance the probability of the harm
posed plus the gravity of the harm which may ensue versus the utility of the thing," but that
"[tjhe rights and duties of the parties must also be considered."); Hopkins v. Travasos, 569 So.
2d 1056 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
158. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 689.
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several decades (or longer), and thus have not been changed in
response to the outpouring of interactive justice scholarship over the
last thirty years. 15 9 However, if the jury instructions already explicitly
or implicitly invoke the interactive justice principle, there is no need
for them to be changed in response to recent interactive justice
scholarship. Indeed, given the misguided nature of much of the
recent interactive justice scholarship,6" there has been very good
reason not to draw on such scholarship in drafting instructions or
deciding cases. Nevertheless, the failure of much of the interactive
justice scholarship, like the economic-efficiency scholarship, to
understand either the actual content of negligence law or the basic
principles that underlie that content, does not prove that a proper
theory of interactive justice would be incompatible with and unable to
explain, illuminate, and guide the resolution of negligence cases in the
courts.
Allen and Rosenberg themselves acknowledge that the reasonable person standard employed by the Restatement and the courts
invites resort to the "concepts of fairness or rights" that are embedded in the interactive justice theory, and that "numerous cases...
depend on such considerations."' 16, The same point can be made,
more strongly, for the "reasonably prudent," "reasonably careful,"
and "ordinary prudence" standards that dominate the states' pattern
jury instructions. "Common sense" as applied to issues of legal
responsibility incorporates deeply embedded notions of fairness and
justice, and juries and judges applying their common sense to resolve
negligent-conduct issues, especially when reminded to apply the
perspective of the "reasonably prudent person," draw, consciously or
62
subconsciously, on the basic principles of justice.1
I agree with Allen and Rosenberg that academic "high" theory is
unlikely to have major impacts on the law of torts or any other basic
area of the law of obligations, which generally (subject to sometimes
conflicting interest-group politics) will be driven by basic notions of
159. See id. at 689, 699, 700, 700-01, 704.
160. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 73 IOWA L. REV. 625
(1992) [hereinafter Wright, Substantive CorrectiveJustice] (criticizing Ernie Weinrib's formalist
theory and Jules Coleman's bifurcated annulment theory); Wright, Standards of Care, supra
note 12, at 252-54 (noting several justice scholars' erroneous treatment of the basic principle of
utilitarianism, the impartiality principle, as a basic principle of justice); Wright, Justice and
Reasonable Care, supra note 5, pts. IV & V (same); see generally Wright, The Principles of
Justice,supra note 25.
161. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 696.
162. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
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fairness and justice that are shared by and accessible to all, whether
or not the academic theory is on target. 63 However, I think that ontarget theoretical expositions of the relevant principles of justice can
be brought to bear on, and provide helpful illumination and guidance
with respect to, specific doctrinal issues and the resolution of particular disputes, while also providing useful general reminders of what
law has been and should continue to be all about. At least that has
been the motivation for my scholarship.
V.

ANITA BERNSTEIN: OBJECTIVE VERSUS SUBJECTIVE
STANDARDS OF CARE

In her contribution to this symposium Anita Bernstein brings her
customary creative intelligence to bear on a less-discussed aspect of
negligence law. Rather than focusing, as the rest of the contributors
have, on the substantive conceptions of reasonableness that are
employed by the courts in negligence cases, she explores the different
perspectives-objective or subjective-that the courts use when
assessing whether a person's conduct was in accord with the applicable conception of reasonableness, however it may be conceived. For
example, while defendants are generally held to the objective standard of the "reasonably prudent" or "reasonably careful" person with
ordinary mental and physical capacities and skills, regardless of their
own individual physical and mental capacities and skills, exceptions
are made for children and persons with physical disabilities, who
instead are generally only held to the subjective standard of a "reasonably careful" person with the same physical and (for children)
mental capacities and skills that are actually possessed by the particular defendant. 164
Bernstein claims that no one has offered a robust, comprehensive
rationale for the generally applicable objective perspective, the
subjective exceptions for children and persons with physical disability
but not for mentally disabled adults, or the tendency of courts and
juries to apply a more subjective perspective when assessing a plaintiff's contributory negligence. 65 As Bernstein notes, 61 6 a frequently
163. 1 am an agnostic with respect to their claim that the law of antitrust has been colonized
by economic efficiency theory. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 719-31. I know very
little about the area, but I have some doubts about their claim based on their own exposition as
well as the durability of notions of justice and fair play in every area of the law.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283-283 C, 289(a) & cmt. n, 290 (1965);
PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 1, at 169. 173-76. 179-82: Bernstein, supra note 34, at 745-47.
165. See Bernstein. supra note 34, at 740, 745-46 & n.37, 749-51.
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mentioned rationale, which is favored by efficiency theorists and
relied on in the draft Restatement Third, is administrative
convenience -avoidance of the administrative expenses of trying to
assess individuals' differing mental capacities and skills, which are
assumed to be much higher than the administrative costs of assessing
(significant) differences in physical capacities and skills. 67 However,
this rationale fails to explain the exception for children, who, except
when engaged in "adult" (dangerous) activities, are judged according
to the very subjective perspective of "a reasonable person of like age,
intelligence, and experience.' 1 68 It also fails to explain the use of the
subjective perspective for persons with superior rather than inferior
capacities and skills, 16 9 for defendants in certain "affirmative duty"
situations, 7" and (often) for plaintiffs in general. 7 ,
A more descriptively plausible and normatively attractive rationale, which is partially adopted by Bernstein'72 and also relied on at
times in the draft Restatement Third, which however fails to fully
understand its implications or to consistently apply it,' is that the
objective standard for defendants (and plaintiffs who put others as
well as themselves at significant risk) is necessary to assure sufficient
166. See id. at 750 n.65.
167. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 11 cmts. a & e; text accompanying
notes 176-77 infra.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 A & cmt. c,§ 464(2) (1965): see DRAFT
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 10(a) ("a reasonably careful person of the same age,
intelligence, and experience"). The draft Restatement Third notes that children in Australia
and England evidently are held to the intermediate (semi-objective or semi-subjective)
perspective of a child of the same age, without taking account of the particular child's
intelligence or experience. See id. § 10 cmt. c.
169. See text accompanying note 182 infra.
170. See text accompanying notes 183-84 infra.
171. See text accompanying notes 185-89 infra. Gary Schwartz once explained tort law's
more lenient treatment of plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence on the ground that, while
the defendant's exposing others to risks that exceed expected benefits can be viewed as
egoistical or antisocial self-preference and hence morally objectionable on utilitarian or fairness
grounds, "it is difficult to identify any clear moral principle that [plaintiff's foolishly exposing
himself to excessive risk] contravenes." See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 701-02 & nn.31 & 33, 722-23 & nn.117 & 118
(1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contributory Negligence]. As he noted, however, this argument
implies there should not even be a contributory negligence defense. See id. Fleming James
argued that the objective perspective for defendants represents a victory for the alleged modern
tort principle of compensating accident victims over the alleged traditional tort principle of
basing liability on personal moral fault, while a more subjective perspective for plaintiffs is
supported by both principles. Fleming James. Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in
Negligence Cases, 16 MO. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1951); see FLEMING, supra note 1, at 285. However.
tort liability is not premised on either compensation per se or personal moral fault.
172. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 736-37: text accompanying notes 232-33 infra.
173. See text accompanying notes 209-29 infra.
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security of others' persons and property. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
famously remarked:
[One rationale is] the impossibility [or difficulty] of nicely measuring a man's powers and limitations.... But a more satisfactory explanation is that, when men live in society, a certain average of
conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a
man is born hasty or awkward, is always having accidents and
hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects
will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to
come up to their standard, and the courts which7 4they establish decline to take his personal equation into account.
As I have previously discussed, 5 this rationale is an interactive
justice rationale, rather than (as is sometimes assumed due to the
reference to "general welfare"' 7 6) a utilitarian efficiency rationale.
According to the standard utilitarian efficiency analysis, a subjective
perspective ideally should be applied to evaluate the reasonableness
of all conduct. It would be inefficient to require all persons to attain
the same level of risk reduction despite widely varying physical,
mental, technical, and economic capacities to achieve such risk
reduction. Instead, each person should be required to invest in care
only to the point where the marginal cost of such care does not
exceed the marginal benefits in reduced risk. Due to differing capacities and thus costs of care, this point will vary for each individual.
Thus, ideally, assuming costless perfect information about individual
capacities, a subjective perspective should be applied to evaluate the
reasonableness of any person's conduct. However, in the real world,
the high administrative costs of ascertaining and measuring individual
capacities usually outweigh the theoretical efficiency gains of the
subjective perspective. To avoid these high administrative costs, the
objective perspective (which is assumed but not shown to be a
second-best efficient solution) must be used, except for those
(in)capacities that are easily ascertainable and measurable at low
cost.",
174. HOLMES, supra note 44, at 86-87 (partially quoted in Bernstein, supra note 34, at 745).
175. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 257-59.
176. See, e.g., Warren Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining
the Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims,
78 GEO. L.J. 241.266 (1989).
177. See, e.g.. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 54-55,
57-59 (2d ed. 2002): WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
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Some efficiency theorists have argued that if potential injurers'
behavior were judged using the subjective perspective, potential
victims would be unable to predict and hence efficiently react to the
legally permissible risks to which they would be exposed.178 But this is
not correct. Any potential victim could calculate an expected risk
exposure by averaging the (subjectively variable) legally permissible
risks created by all the potential injurers. A potential victim with
actual knowledge of these risks could explicitly calculate this average
and then calculate his own efficient level of care. A potential victim
without such actual knowledge (the real world situation) presumably
would and should assume that the potential injurers' subjectively
varying levels of efficient risk creation are fairly uniformly distributed
above and below the efficient level of risk creation for the "typical"
or "ordinary" potential injurer, and hence could and should calculate
his own efficient level of care based on the level of efficient risk
creation for the typical or ordinary potential injurer. Thus, the
difficulties that potential victims face in estimating their risk exposure
when the subjective perspective is applied to potential injurers are no
worse than, and indeed are identical to, the difficulties that they face
when the objective perspective is applied.
Under the interactive justice theory, on the other hand, a minimum level of care specified by the objective "reasonably careful
person" standard is generally required, as a matter of justice, for
persons (defendants or plaintiffs) putting others at significant risk.
According to the basic moral premise of individuals' right to equal
freedom, dignity, and respect, which underlies and gives substantive
content to the principles of justice, the "common good" is not (as
under utilitarian efficiency theories) the maximization of society-wide
aggregate benefits minus aggregate costs, without regard to the
distribution of the benefits and costs, but rather the concurrent,
interdependent, and harmonious fulfillment of each individual's
humanity. The principles of justice address the external conditions
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 123-26 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 167 (4th ed. 1992); Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine Causes More Lawsuits, and New
Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1068, 1085 (1992);

Schwartz, supra note 176, at 278. Guido Calabresi has suggested (with reservations) that
applying an objective perspective regardless of subjective (in)capacities will steer the "accident
prone" away from activities in which their propensities create the greatest dangers. GUIDO
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A
PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 33-34 (1985); see Schwartz, supra, at 246-47. This argument. like the

administrative cost argument, would apply to plaintiffs as well as defendants.
178. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 177, at 55.
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that are properly specifiable by law for the attainment of this common good: providing for a fair distribution among the members of
society of the instrumental goods that are necessary or useful for
persons' exercise of their external freedom, which is the focus of the
principle of distributive justice, and assuring sufficient security of
individuals' persons and existing stocks of instrumental goods in their
interactions with others, which is the focus of the principle of interac179
tive justice.
The external exercise of one's right to equal freedom depends on
sufficient security against interferences by others with one's person
and property. As Holmes noted, regardless of measurement problems, using a subjective perspective to determine the negligence of
defendants would make such security impossible, since the risks to
which a person could permissibly be exposed by others would depend
on the subjective capacities of the particular others with whom that
person happens (often unpredictably) to interact. To have sufficiently secure (or any true) rights in one's person and property, those
rights must be defined by an objectively specified maximum level of
risk to which one's person and property can be exposed by others.
This level, which may vary in different types of situations, must be
specified so as to further the common good-i.e., the maximization of
every person's equal external freedom-which may also be described
as the level of risk that would be deemed reasonable by the reasonably prudent person who has a proper respect for the persons and
property of others. A failure to adhere to this objectively specified
level of care constitutes "legal fault," for the adverse consequences of
which you are morally responsible, whether or not you were also
morally at fault-and thus subject to moral blame-because you did
not do all you were capable of doing to try to adhere to the objectively specified level of care.' 8 ' In sum, as we previously noted, the
179. See Wright, The Principlesof Justice, supra note 25, at 1861-71, 1885-88.
180. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, at 40 (1915) ("Negligence is
conduct, not a state of mind."); Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1927); id. at 4 ("There is no subjective legal fault."). William Rodgers
agrees that tort liability should be grounded on respect for persons, but erroneously assumes
that this requires basing liability on personal desert (merit or blame), which in turn allegedly
requires that strict liability (for defendants) or the assumption of risk defense (for plaintiffs)
should apply to persons who act "rationally" in the decision-theoretic sense of conscious costbenefit analysis, while a subjective "best efforts" fault standard should apply to defendants and
plaintiffs who act "nonrationally" (i.e., through biologically and socially determined responses).
See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory,
54 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1980). I find it difficult to follow Rodgers' arguments. He
implausibly assumes that (1) applying instrumental utilitarian efficiency analysis to "rational"
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question of justice and legal liability is one of objective Right rather
than subjective virtue.18
Unlike the administrative convenience rationale, which would
not take into account (difficult to measure) subjective capacities,
skills, or knowledge in order to raise or lower the required level of
care, the interactive justice rationale matches actual negligence law by
making the objective standard of care only a minimum required level
of care. If a person has superior rather than inferior capacity, skill, or
knowledge, that subjective capacity, skill, or knowledge morally
should be and is taken into account by judges and juries in assessing
whether that person has behaved reasonably in putting others'
persons or property at risk.'
Conversely, unlike the administrative
convenience rationale, the interactive justice rationale is consistent
with the courts' use of a subjective perspective to lower the required
level of care for defendants in situations in which it is the rights of the
defendant, rather than the plaintiff, that are paramount. In cases
involving the duty of care owed by land occupiers with respect to onactors is consistent with personal desert and respect for persons, (2) that "rational" defendants
are always the cheapest cost avoiders, even when faced with "rational" plaintiffs, and thus
should be subject to Calabresian strict liability, and (3) that it makes sense to apply a "best
efforts" personal-desert fault standard to persons assumed to be behaving "nonrationally." His
application of the "rational" versus "nonrational" actor distinction to the case law seems to me
to be entirely ad hoc and result-oriented.
181. Contra Bernstein, supra note 34, at 735; David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV.
703, 716, 719. 723-24 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes:
Three Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24, 35-38, 40, 45 n.57 (Ken CooperStephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and
Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 452-55 (1990); cf.Grady, supra note 177.
at 1082-85 (claiming that the strict liability aspect of objective negligence for those with
subnormal capacities or skills, which has long been noted in the traditional tort literature, is a
feature of tort law "that the law and economics literature has recently uncovered" that is
inconsistent with interactive justice). These writers fail to note the distinction between justice
and legal liability, on the one hand, and virtue and moral blame or merit, on the other, that has
long been stressed in theories of justice. See Wright, The Principles of Justice, supra note 25, at
1876-82. For example, Kant's moral philosophy distinguishes between a doctrine of virtue and
a doctrine of Right (justice and law). The doctrine of virtue, while specifying objective moral
duties based on the categorical imperative, assesses the moral blame or merit of conduct in
terms of the individual's subjective capacity and effort in attempting to ascertain and satisfy
those duties. The doctrine of Right, on the other hand, directly applies the objective
requirements of the categorical imperative in determining an individual's moral and legal
responsibility for the adverse effects that she causes to the person or property of others. Thus.
as Kant repeatedly emphasizes, an action's legality is judged by its external conformity with the
objective requirements of Right, while it's morality is judged by the actor's internal subjective
capacity and efforts to conform her conduct to the objective requirements of the categorical
imperative, which grounds all duties of Right and virtue. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *214, 218-32, 312, 379-80, 381-83 & n.*, 389-94, 401, 404-05, 44647, 463 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289(b) & cmt. m (1965); id. § 298 & cmt. d;
DRAFT RESTATEMENTTHIRD, supra note 17, § 12.
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premises risks to entrants on their land, the applicable perspective
shifts from the usual objective perspective to an increasingly
subjective perspective, which takes into account the capacities,
knowledge, and financial resources of the land occupier, as the status
of the entrant shifts from that of a lawful invitee to a mere licensee to
a wrongful trespasser.u83 Similarly, the weaker the relationship
between the parties, the more courts should and do take into account
the subjective capacities and knowledge of the particular defendant in
deciding whether she should have an affirmative duty to aid another
whom she has not put at risk and in assessing, should such a duty be
found to exist, whether she was negligent in her performance of that
duty.' 84

The interactive justice rationale, unlike the administrative convenience rationale, also explains and justifies judges' and juries'
tendency (which is noted by Bernstein

85

and others'86 but not the

183. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 265-66; text accompanying notes 49,
57-58 supra. The Restatement Second phrases the limited duty that a land occupier owes to
trespassers in terms of what he "knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know" and
"has reason to believe" regarding a "constant" trespasser on a limited area, "knows or has
reason to know/believe" regarding a current trespasser, and "knows or has reason to know" and
"realizes or should realize" regarding a child trespasser. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 333-339 (1965). The land occupier's limited duty to licensees is phrased in terms of what he
"knows or has reason to know" and "should realize/expect." See id. §§ 341 & 342. The land
occupier's general duty to invitees is phrased in terms of what he "knows or by the exercise of
reasonable care would discover" or "should realize/expect/anticipate." See id. §§ 341A, 343 &
343A. For the fine but significant distinctions between "from facts within his knowledge should
know [without any further inquiry]" (least demanding), "has reason to know [after further
inquiry in light of the known facts]" (intermediately demanding), and "should know" (most
demanding, and the usual negligence standard), see id. § 334 cmt. c. Only "should know"
implies an objective duty to inspect for possible dangers, in the absence of knowledge of facts
indicating such a possibility.
184. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 271-74.
185. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 750.
186. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 177, at 25-26, 32-33, 46-54, 143 n.108, 147 n.131;
FLEMING, supra note 1. at 285; 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, § 16.2 at 392-93 & n.17, § 16.7 at
428-34; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra, § 22.10 at 334-38; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 65 at
455 & nn.36, 37 & 41; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1-2(d), I2(d)(1).

13-2(a)

(3d

ed. 1994)

[hereinafter

SCHWARTZ,

COMPARATIVE

NEGLIGENCE];

Schwartz, Contributory Negligence, supra note 171, at 717 n.94, 722 n.117; Gary T. Schwartz,
Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,90 Yale L.J.
1717, 1743-47, 1750-52, 1759-63 & n.333 (1981): Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early
American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 661-66 (1989). Calabresi discusses, inter alia. the
religious-belief cases, which dramatically illustrate the use of the dual perspective: objective for
defendants, subjective for plaintiffs. See CALABRESI, supra, at 46-54. For example, in
Friedman v. New York, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967), a 16-year old Orthodox Jewish woman was
held not to have been contributorily negligent when she jumped off a ski lift, negligently shut
down by the defendant, to comply with what she believed to be an absolute religious
requirement that an unmarried woman should not be with a man after dark in a place where she
could not readily be reached by others (she was with a 19-year-old male friend). The most
common religious belief cases involve mitigation of damages, rather than contributory
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Restatements) to apply a more lenient, subjective perspective to

assessments of a plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence, at least in
those situations in which the plaintiff's conduct created significant
risks only to himself.18 7 The rationale for adopting the objective
standard of care as the minimum level of required care is the necessity of doing so to protect individuals' persons and property from
risks created by others. That rationale does not apply to a plaintiff
whose conduct only created significant risks to himself,'8 so the shift
from the otherwise morally preferable subjective perspective to the
rights-protecting objective perspective need not, indeed should not,
occur.

The more clearly the risks created by the plaintiff were solely to
himself, the more likely that a subjective perspective will be used.

negligence per se. See, e.g., Lange v. Hoyt, 159 A.2d 575, 577-78 (Conn. 1932) (plaintiff's
Christian Science religious beliefs may be taken into account in determining the reasonableness
of her failure to obtain medical treatment); Christiansen v. Hollings, 112 P.2d 723, 730 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (same); Warren V. Ludlum, Jr., Plaintiffs Duty to Minimize Defendant's
Liability by Surgery, 17 TENN. L. REV. 821 (1943). Much less deference is paid to a person's
religious beliefs which expose others to risk, especially outside but even within the parent-child
relationship. For example, imagine that Ms. Friedman had landed on the head of a skier when
she jumped off of the ski lift. The especially difficult cases are those in which a parent refuses to
obtain medical treatment for a child due to the parent's religious beliefs. See Hansen v.
Bussman, 549 P.2d 1265, 1276 (Ore. 1976) (citing numerous sources). In the absence of a
statutory exception for spiritual treatment, parents are held criminally liable under child abuse
and homicide statutes for failure to obtain proper medical treatment for their children, despite
their religious beliefs. See Washington v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991). Many states have
enacted statutory exceptions, which, however, are thought to raise constitutional Establishment
Clause problems if they are not absolute exceptions. See Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1991) (tort liability), Minnesota v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991) (criminal):
Hermonson v. Florida, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992) (criminal).
187. This qualification is a modification of my previously published argument, which did not
distinguish situations in which plaintiffs put only themselves at risk from those in which they
also created significant risks to others. See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 257-59.
188. See, e.g.. Rossman v. LaGrega, 270 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1971) ("[T]here is a qualitative
difference, when it comes to imposing liability on such a theory as tort, between one whose
negligent act does harm to others and one whose negligent act does harm to himself, and the
same mechanistic standard ought not be applied undifferentially as to both."). In his influential
article on negligence, Henry Terry, after stating that "[tihere seems to be no difference in
respect to its nature between contributory negligence and negligence toward others," noted that
while negligence toward others is "a breach of a perfect legal duty owed to someone else, for
whose breach an action will lie," contributory negligence, "when it has any legal effect, [is] a
breach of an imperfect legal duty to use care for the safety of one's self or one's belongings in
certain cases where some one else has an interest in such safety. The duty is a legal duty, but an
imperfect duty only insomuch as no action will lie for its breach. Its sanction consists in the
refusal of a remedy which might otherwise have been had for the other party's breach of duty."
Terry, supra note 180, at 40. Terry's distinction between the "perfect" legal duty of the
defendant and the "imperfect" legal duty of the plaintiff bears a marked resemblance to Kant's
distinction between the perfect duties of Right and the imperfect duties of virtue (with the latter
encompassing all duties to oneself). See Wright, Substantive CorrectiveJustice, supra note 160.
at 659-60.
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The most dramatic example is the adoption of rules by a substantial
majority of jurisdictions, by judicial decision or statute or both, that
refuse to allow a plaintiff's failure to use an automobile seat belt to be
used as evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence or, less
frequently, allow it to be used to establish not more than a specified
small percentage of comparative responsibility. s9 Numerous rationales have been offered for these rules-for example, maximizing
manufacturers' incentive to design safer vehicles or maximizing injury
compensation through automobile liability insurance, which is more
widespread (although more costly to administer) than first-party
medical, disability, or automobile-collision insurance. However, the
only rationale that distinguishes the failure to use a seat belt from
other causes of automobile-related injuries, such as (other forms of)
inattentiveness or speeding, to which the contributory negligence
defense fully applies, is that the failure to use a seat belt, unlike the
other causes, puts only oneself at risk. As such, it gives rise to a
justifiable, sympathetic, subjective response, based on the perception
that the failure to use the seat belt usually or often is due to inadvertence rather than a deliberate choice and-the critical distinctionthat it put only the plaintiff himself at risk.
Holmes implicitly set aside the "more satisfactory" interactive
justice rationale and returned to the administrative convenience
rationale when he "cautiously" argued for applying a subjective
perspective to defendants as well as plaintiffs when they have "a
distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize it as making
certain precautions impossible":
There are exceptions to the principle that every man is presumed to
possess ordinary capacity to avoid harm to his neighbors, which illustrate the rule, and also the moral basis of liability in general.
When a man has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize it as making certain precautions impossible, he will not be
held answerable for not taking them. A blind man is not required
to see at his peril; and although he is, no doubt, bound to consider
his infirmity in regulating his actions, yet if he properly finds himself in a certain situation, the neglect of precautions requiring eyesight would not prevent his recovering for an injury to himself, and,
189. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 95-1/2, $ 12-603.1 (Supp. 1985) ("Failure to wear a seat
safety belt in violation of this Section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not
limit the liability of an insurer, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle."): Swajian v. General Motors
Corp.. 559 A.2d 1041 (R.I. 1989) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT
LIABILITY § 16 cmt. f. Reporters' Notes. at 254 (1999) (surveying the state statutes): FLEMING,
supra note 1, at 280-81; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.10 at 339-41 n.17.
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it may be presumed, would not make him liable for injuring another. So it is held that, in cases where he is the plaintiff, an infant
of very tender years is only bound to take the precautions of which
an infant is capable; the same principle may be cautiously applied
where he is defendant. Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal
with, and no general rule can be laid down about it. There is no
doubt that in many cases a man may be insane, and yet perfectly
capable of taking the precautions, and of being influenced by the
motives, which the circumstances demand. But if insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from
complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would require it to be admitted as an excuse. 19°
Holmes had reason to be cautious. Under the "more satisfactory" interactive justice rationale, the subnormal capacities and skills
of a defendant should be taken into account only if this can be done
without adversely affecting the security of others' rights in their
persons and property. This again matches actual negligence law.
A defendant with an obvious physical incapacity (e.g., lack of vision, hearing, or legs or substandard agility or skill due to inexperience or old age) is not required to do what she is incapable of doing
(e.g., seeing, hearing, walking, or displaying the agility or skill of an
experienced or younger person). However, she is required to take
whatever additional precautions are necessary to reduce the foreseeable risks to others to the acceptable level specified by the objective
standard of care. If she is able to do so, her physical incapacity will be
taken into account in evaluating her conduct. If she is not able to do
so, her physical incapacity will not be taken into account. Instead, she
must avoid engaging in the particular activity (e.g., a blind person is
not allowed to drive).191 As Bernstein states, the care required of the

physically disabled is "[n]ot higher, not lower, just different" 92different in terms of the specific required precautions, but not
different in terms of the required minimum level of care to avoid
putting the persons and property of others at excessive, unaccepted
risk. The great majority of cases in which the subjective perspective is
used involve plaintiffs, rather than defendants, with a physical incapacity.1 93
190. HOLMES, supra note 44,at 87-88.
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 C cmt. c (1965); DRAFT RESTATEMENT
THIRD, supra note 17, § 11 cmt. b. FLEMING, supra note 1, at 112-13: 3 HARPER ET AL., supra
note 1, § 16.7 at 421-24: KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32 at 175-76.
192. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 749.
193. See FLEMING, supra note 1, at 114: 3 HARPER ET AL.. supra note 1,§ 16.7 at 428 &
nn.16 & 17.
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As Bernstein discusses, 94 a dual standard clearly exists for persons with significant mental disability. As far back as 1915, Henry
Terry stated in his leading article on negligence:
In the case of contributory negligence there is an exception to [the
objective "standard man"] rule in the case of abnormal persons,
such as children and persons of unsound mind. They are not required to act like a standard man, but only to use such judgment as
they are capable of. But as to negligence which is not merely contributory, as to negligent wrongs against others, the standard man
test applies to their conduct also. 195

As long as there was volitional conduct-which is the minimum
requirement for moral and hence legal responsibility- a defendant
will be held liable for negligence despite being unable to appreciate
the risks that she creates to others as a result of her mental disability. 96 Like the self-described "limited intelligence" defendant in the
classic case of Vaughan v. Menlove, 97 an insane or otherwise mentally
deficient defendant will not have her mental incapacity taken into
account, since, unlike significant physical disabilities, there is no way

194. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 750-53.
195. Terry, supra note 180, at 47.
196. One court has indicated a willingness to take a defendant's unforeseeable supposed
"temporary insanity" into account, analogizing it to epileptic seizures or heart attacks. The
court stated that there should be no liability when there was no forewarning, but that a
defendant who was aware of her susceptibility could be held liable for failing to take steps to
guard against injuring others when such episodes occurred. See Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co.,
173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970). The court's analogy fails to note the lack of volitional conduct by
the defendant overcome by an unforeseeable sudden onset of physical incapacity, in contrast
with the deluded yet volitional conduct by the mentally impaired. Cf. Roberts v. Ramsbottom,
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 823 (defendant who continued to drive after suffering partially disabling
[heart?] attack held liable); Broome v. Perkins, [1987] R.T.R. 321 (defendant who knew he was
diabetic and had disabling attack while driving held liable). A defendant subject to foreseeable,
preventable occurrences of "temporary insanity," like those subject to pronounced physical
incapacity, can take alternative precautions (for example, medicines to treat a chemical
imbalance in the brain) to attain the specified objective level of care, thereby assuring the
appropriate level of security for the persons and property of others. However, there seems to
be little reason to treat a defendant overcome by unforeseeable permanent or temporary
insanity any differently than a permanently insane defendant, and the Breunig court's statement
to the contrary has not been followed by other courts. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 17, § 11(c) cmt. e, Reporters' Note, at 161-62. Nor was it even followed by the Breunig
court, which upheld a jury verdict that the defendant was liable although it is highly doubtful (1)
that the defendant was aware of the irrationality of her beliefs and visions or (2) that she or
anyone else had forewarning that her irrational beliefs might pose a risk of injury to others (or
herself). The draft Restatement's assumption that the Breunig jury found that the defendant
had adequate foreknowledge, see id., is questionable. After beginning its deliberation, the jury
asked, "If [the defendant] is found not negligent, will it mean Mr. Breunig will receive no
compensation?." but received no answer, and two jurors dissented from the verdict for the
plaintiff. "expressly stat[ing] they could find no evidence of forewarning." Breunig, 173 N.W.2d
at 625.
197. 132 ENG. REP. 490 (C.P. 1837).
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to do so that would be consistent with the security of others' rights in
their person and property.' 98 However, as numerous commentators
and courts have stated, such mental disability should be and is taken
into account in analyzing a plaintiff's contributory negligence. 99 The
interactive justice rationale for applying the objective perspective to a
mentally deficient defendant does not apply to a mentally deficient

plaintiff, who therefore "may not be held to any greater degree of
care for his own safety than that which he is capable of exercising."",,,
As one of the leading torts treatises states,
In the case of mentally defective or insane plaintiffs.... the policy
arguments [for the objective standard for defendants] lose much of
their force.... Because of the obviously different equities of the
situation, the great majority of courts in the contributory negligence
context apply a lower standard of care and consider the plaintiff's
incapacity as only one of the "circumstances"
to be considered in
201
judging the quality of his conduct.
Some earlier opinions held the plaintiff who was not totally insane
to the same standard of safety for his own protection as a normal
person. Recent decisions have rejected such distinctions and permit the trier of fact to determine if the plaintiff's mental202condition
deprived him of the ability to perceive or avoid the harm.
Even the dean of the defense lawyers, Victor Schwartz, agrees:

"Because of the flexibility inherent in comparative negligence, it
would seem appropriate to permit a plaintiff to present to the jury
facts bearing on his mental capacity that might serve to diminish his
fault."2°3

The Restatement Second acknowledged, in a backhanded manner, the propriety and possible existence of the dual perspective for
insane persons, but not for those with less pronounced forms of
198. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 11 cmt. e at 153.
199. See CALABRESI, supra note 177, at 25-26, 32-33. 143 n.108; FLEMING, supra note 1, at
114 n.80; 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, § 16.7 at 428-34; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32 at
176-78; SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 186, § 13.3(a) at 278-79;
Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J.
153 (1983); James, supra note 171, at 25-26.
200. Banks v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted).
201. KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32 at 178.
202. Id. at 178 n.39 (citations omitted); see Snider v. Callahan, 250 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (W.D.
Mo. 1966) (stating that Missouri and many other states apply a dual standard to defendants and
plaintiffs, not only regarding the insane but also those with less serious mental incapacity); 3
HARPER ET AL., supra note 1, § 16.7 at 432 & n.34; Alison P. Raney, Stacy v. Jedco
Construction. Inc.: North Carolina adopts a Diminished Capacity Standard for Contributory
Negligence, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215 (1996) (discussing cases from a number of
jurisdictions and stating that a majority of states that have recently addressed the issue have
applied the subjective perspective to persons of diminished mental capacity short of insanity).
203. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, supra note 186, § 13.3(a) at 279.
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mental deficiency. It stated that the objective perspective applies to
defendants 2 41 and, "[u]nless the actor is a child or an insane person,"
to plaintiffs, 2115 and, in a caveat, it stated, "The Institute expresses no
opinion as to whether insane persons are or are not required to
conform for their own protection to the standard of conduct which
society demands of sane persons."2z6 In a comment, it claimed that
"[n]o case has been found dealing with the question whether insanity
will excuse conduct which would otherwise be contributory negligence, where the insane person himself suffers harm." But it acknowledged that "[i]t is possible that the policy factors stated [for
applying the objective perspective to mentally deficient defendants]
may not have the same force as applied to contributory negligence.
The question is therefore left open in the Caveat. '' 217 Itasserted,
however, that "[m]ental deficiency which falls short of insanity...
does not excuse conduct which is otherwise contributory negligence.'"208
Ignoring the apparently unanimous contrary consensus by past
and present treatise writers and other commentators, as well as the
case law that, since the Restatement Second was published, has
increasingly recognized that a subjective perspective should be
applied not only to insane plaintiffs but also to any plaintiff with a
significant mental deficiency, 2 9 the draft Restatement Third rejects
even the qualified position stated in the Restatement Second and
applies the objective perspective to mentally deficient plaintiffs as
well as defendants. 2 11 The reporters apparently felt compelled to
march in lockstep with the position that was previously prematurely
adopted, without any consideration of the cases or substantive
policies, in the Restatement Third on Apportionment of Liability as a
result of that Restatement's misguided insistence on uniform rules to
ease apportionment calculations regardless of substantive differences
between different types of situations.211

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 283 B & cmt. c (1965).
Id. § 464(1).
Id. § 464 Caveat.
Id. § 464 cmt. g.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 194-202 supra.
DRAFT RESTATEMENTTHIRD. supra note 17, § 1 (c).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 & cmt. a &
Reporters' Note (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD: APPORTIONMENT].
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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The draft Restatement Third explicitly tracks the position and
reasoning in the Restatement Third on Apportionment of Liability:
Restatement Third, Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 3, Comment a, concludes that the "[s]tandard for plaintiff's negligence [is
the] same as [the] standard for defendant's negligence. The shift in
tort doctrine from contributory negligence as a full defense to comparative responsibility as a partial defense weakens whatever argument there otherwise might favor a dual standard that would
treat the mentally disabled plaintiff more leniently than the mentally disabled defendant (sic). Under comparative responsibility,
that plaintiff, even if found contributorily negligent, may well encounter only a limited reduction in the award the plaintiff receives
from the defendant found guilty (sic) of negligence. Moreover,
even though the plaintiff's mental disability is ignored in considering whether the plaintiff is contributorily negligent at all, under Restatement Third, Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 8, Comment
c, that disability can be considered in the course of the more openended process of apportioning percentages of responsibility between the plaintiff and the defendant. 2
There are several obvious flaws in this argument. First, given the
modified comparative responsibility rules that exist in most states, a
plaintiff will still be completely barred from any recovery if his
comparative responsibility equals or exceeds the defendant(s)'
comparative responsibility. Second, it is analytically incoherent and
unprincipled to recognize the "intuitive argument that imposing risks
on oneself is morally different from imposing risks on others, even
when tort law later shifts the financial consequences of those risks to
others,"2" 3 so that "a plaintiff's conduct that imposes risks on others
may be valued differently from conduct that imposes risks only on the
plaintiff,"2 4 and thus to allow consideration of the plaintiff's mental
212. DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 11 cmt. e at 154; see RESTATEMENT
THIRD: APPORTIONMENT, supra note 211, § 3 cmt. a & Reporters' Note.
213. RESTATEMENT THIRD: APPORTIONMENT, supra note 211, § 3 cmt. a,Reporters' Note,
at 37. In both Restatements, the reporters attempt to employ the non-rights-respecting Coasian
move of treating the defendant's potential financial liability to the plaintiff, which is the just
consequence of the defendant's having negligently injured the plaintiff, as an imposition of a
risk on the defendant by the plaintiff that is not morally distinguishable from the defendant's
having negligently put the plaintiff's person or property at risk. See id.; DRAFT RESTATEMENT
THIRD, Reporters' Note, supra note 17, § 11 cmt. e at 155. Defense lawyers wisely avoid
making this sophistric economic argument to judges and jurors. However, proper regard for the
defendant's equal freedom suggests that a plaintiff's conduct perhaps should be deemed
negligent and thus affect his right of recovery, even if it was subjectively reasonable in the light
of his own physical and mental capacities and beliefs, if it was unforeseeably idiosyncratic-that
is, if it fell outside the (broad) range of foreseeable behavior for the great mass of persons in
similar situations. Yet the range of behavior deemed reasonable under the more subjective
perspective applied to plaintiffs is sometimes very broad, especially in cases involving religious
belief. See note 186 supra.
214. DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 3 cmt. a, at 29.
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deficiency during the apportionment calculations, while refusing to
allow consideration of it when determining whether the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent.
Third, and most importantly, the primary (and only comprehensive) rationale for applying the objective perspective to mentally
deficient persons, which the draft Restatement Third itself emphasizes after mentioning the administrative convenience rationale, 25 is
the interactive justice rationale: the necessity of doing so to sufficiently secure individuals' rights in their persons and property. As
commentators and courts have consistently stated in defending and
applying the dual perspective for mentally deficient persons, both
before and (increasingly) after the adoption of comparative responsibility, this rationale applies to mentally deficient defendants, but not
to mentally deficient plaintiffs with respect to injuries they themselves
suffer as a result of their mental deficiency. Contrary to the argument
in the draft Restatement Third (and the Restatement Third on
Apportionment of Liability), the shift to comparative responsibility
does not weaken or in any way affect this conclusion. Bernstein
makes this point more poetically:
Both judges and scholars have written that in evaluating the behavior of a mentally disabled actor they favor an objective standard
when the actor has hurt others, and a subjective standard when the
actor has hurt himself. Decisional law so holding comes from not
only the era of full-bar contributory negligence but also the current
climate of apportionment, suggesting that this tendency cannot be
written off as mere pity for helpless (and bygone) wretches who
would otherwise recover nothing
even though their contribution to
216
their own injury was slight.
Analyzing the cases cited in the draft Restatement Third,
Bernstein reports that "[a]though the Reporters' Note obscured this
point somewhat, most of the decisions mentioned do not support the
Third Restatement view, and several of them relax the standard of
care for plaintiffs. '2'7 She notes further that cited cases that ruled
against the plaintiff declared in dicta that a relaxed standard will
sometimes be proper." 8 The reporters' own discussion of the cases,
which states that they could find only one case that held that even
severe mental illness is not a relevant factor, strongly suggests, in

215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. § 11 cmt. e,at 151-53.
See Bernstein. supra note 34, at 751 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 752 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 752 n.76.

2002] NEGLIGENCE IN THE COURTS: INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

481

accordance with findings by others, that almost all courts are willing
to consider a plaintiff's verifiable significant mental deficiency when
there is sufficient evidence that the mental deficiency contributed to
219
the particular alleged negligent conduct.

A subjective perspective (a reasonable child of the same age, intelligence, and experience) traditionally has been applied to child
plaintiffs in the United States. While a number of jurisdictions
formerly employed a dual perspective, using an objective perspective
22
for child defendants and a subjective one for child plaintiffs, 0 most
jurisdictions now also apply the subjective perspective to child defendants. However, almost all states shift to the objective perspective of
a reasonable adult when the child is engaged in a dangerous "adult"
activity.22' While the Restatement Second focused unhelpfully on the
adult nature of the activity, defining an "adult activity" as "an activity
which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult
qualifications are required,"2 22 the comments in the draft Restatement
Third emphasize the relevant factors that were originally discussed in
the leading case on this issue, Dellwo v. Pearson,23 without, however,
citing Dellwo: the serious (hazardous or "distinctly dangerous")
nature of the risk that the activity poses to others, especially when
engaged in by a child, and the inability of those others, without
significant burden, to recognize the child's involvement and avoid or
acceptably minimize the risk.221 Unfortunately, however, rather than
focusing the blackletter language in subsection 10(c) on both Dellwo
factors, the draft Restatement Third only mentions the dangerousness
of the activity and retains the unhelpful and indeed misleading
reference to activities that are "characteristically undertaken by
adults." 22 5 The unhelpful and misleading nature of the "adult" activity

terminology is indicated by the list of activities that have been held to
219. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 11 cmt. e, at 160-61.
220. For example, the dual standard was stated in dicta in Roberts v. Ring, 173 N.W. 437, 438
(Minn. 1919), and reaffirmed in dicta in Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.w.2d 859 (Minn. 1961),
before being rejected, without oral argument and without any exploration of underlying
rationales, in Miller v. State, 306 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. 1981).
221. See DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 10(a) & (c) & cmt. f; 3 HARPER ET
AL., supra note 1, § 16.8; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32 at 179-82.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 A cmt. c (1965).
223. 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1961). Thus, Bernstein and Dan Dobbs are incorrect when
they state that Dellwo merely provided an ill-fitting list of allegedly "adult" activities but no
comprehensive analytic category or principle. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 759 & nn.102 &
103 (quoting DOBBS, supra note 1, at 299-300).
224. DRAFT RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 17, § 10 cmt. f.
225. Id. § 10(c).
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be so-called "adult" activities by the courts, which includes the
operation of "minibikes,
motorscooters, dirt
bikes, and
2 26
snowmobiles.
The bifurcated perspective applied to children, which is (once
again) irreconcilable with the administrative convenience rationale, is
consistent with and indeed obviously based on the interactive justice
rationale. As with the general treatment of persons with physical or
mental disabilities, a child's lesser physical and/or mental capacity or
skill is taken into account only when we are able to do so without
undermining the security of others' rights in their persons and property. The draft Restatement acknowledges this point: "Inasmuch as
the concept of dangerous activities looks mainly to dangers running to
third parties, the rule set forth in Subsection (c) incorporates
elements of the dual-standard reasoning ...."227
The draft Restatement's (and a minority of courts') categorical
treatment of defendants less than five years of age as being incapable
of negligence2a is not consistent with the interactive justice rationale.
It is true, as the draft Restatement states, that "the possibility is slight
that the conduct of a child under five is either deserving of moral
criticism or is capable of being deterred by the application of tort
rules."22 9 However, the same is true for insane adults and many
children five years or older, as well as for the "legally faulty" behavior
of many "normal" adults, all of whom the draft Restatement properly
treats as being subject to liability as defendants under the objective
perspective. It is also true for insane persons and infants who unwittingly commit and are held liable for intentional torts. Tort liability,
as we have seen, is not based on moral fault or efficient deterrence,
but rather on moral responsibility for injury caused by "legally faulty"
behavior, which is behavior that creates socially unacceptable (not
equal-freedom maximizing) risks to the persons and property of
others.
Referring to my prior brief presentation of the interactive justice
rationale for the various objective and subjective perspectives that are
applied by the courts in different types of situations,2 30 which has been
more fully elaborated above, Bernstein states:
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. § 10(c) cmt. f, at 133.
Id. at 134.
See id. § 10(b).
See id. § 10 cmt. d at 131.
See Wright, Standards of Care, supra note 12, at 257-59.
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This perspective, yet another scholarly conjunction of freedom and
security, perceives invasions from the plaintiff's or victim's perspective. From that vantage point, however, strict liability would serve
as well as negligence; Wright has not so much defended the objective standard as rejected excuses or defenses based on inability to
fulfill its demands. He has, however, noted a significant distinction
between negligence and contributory negligence."'
Yet Bernstein bases her own "group-based constraint" theory on
acceptance of the general need for an objective perspective to be
applied to defendants to achieve the proper "mediat[ion] between
'
freedom and security,"232
with exceptions from the objective
perspective being based on supposedly adequate substitution of
23 The interactive justice theory I
nonlegal "group-based constraints.""
elaborate does not focus solely on the plaintiff's perspective; it rather
focuses on the nature of the rights that are defined by interactive
justice to maximize the equal external freedom of everyone, both
defendants and plaintiffs, and indeed it sometimes treats the rights of
the defendant as paramount.23 4 I offer an affirmative interactive
justice rationale for the general (but not universal) application of the
objective perspective to defendants, explain why certain deviations
from the objective perspective for defendants are consistent with that
rationale, and point out that the rationale does not justify applying an
objective perspective to plaintiffs unless, unusually, their relevant
conduct puts others at significant risk as well as themselves. It is part
of an interactive justice account of negligent conduct-of what
constitutes reasonable or unreasonable behavior-which is a question
that is irrelevant under strict liability.
Bernstein recasts negligence law's attempt to provide sufficient
security of one's person and property against adverse risks created by
others into a Machiavellian form. Asserting that negligence liability
claims are "moralistic accusations" by plaintiffs against defendants
and that a defendant determined to have been negligent "has been
'
condemned as blameworthy,"2 35
she suggests that negligence law
attempts to eliminate or at least shift away from itself some of the
resentment created by such condemnation by creating subjectiveperspective exceptions to the usual objective standard of care for

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Bernstein, supra note 34, at 746 n.37.
See id.at 736, 756.
See text accompanying notes 235-39 infra.
See text accompanying notes 183-84 supra; cf. note 213 supra.
See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 735.
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members of certain "communities," '236 which are defined by the
presence of "group-based constraint with respect to behaviors that
imperil the physical safety of others, ' 237 thereby "outsourc[ing]" to
such "communities" the security-maintaining function that is usually
performed by negligence law's objective standard of care.23 The
group-based constraint "can be any kind of characteristic shared with
others that limits the freedom of an actor to exercise his freedom to
inflict accidental harm-usually by incapacitating him in a verifiable
way, but sometimes (as in the case of medical malpractice...)
'239
through social, peer-enforced judgments.
This is a creative and provocative theory. However, I don't think
it fits the actual contours of negligence law doctrine and practice.
First of all, in no situation, except with respect to the (inappropriate)
special treatment given to medical professionals regarding medical
treatment decisions (but not decisions regarding provision of medical
information to their patients), does tort law actually defer to the
constraints that a particular group deems proper for itself, which
rather are always subject to evaluation and possible repudiation as
being insufficiently respectful of the rights of others.24" Second, I
don't think Bernstein's criterion of group-based constraint can
identify the particular exceptions from the objective perspective that
are recognized in negligence law while excluding those that are not.
For example, Bernstein states that neither her being a woman
nor her being a Jew would make her a member of a community of
group-based constraint, since these affiliations "do not stop me much
from hurting others by accident. '24' Why not? If constraints imposed
by parents on children make children a community of group-based
constraint, despite children themselves being "heedless, feckless, and
inattentive by nature ...little accident-bombs likely to go off at any
time,' 242 why are members of religious communities, especially the
more fundamentalist or authoritarian ones, which attempt to
inculcate and enforce moral strictures on their members, including
moral strictures on adverse interactions with others, not members of
communities of group-based constraint? Why are women, who
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See id. at 736, 738-39.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 741-42; see id. at 738-39.
Id. at 741.
See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 741.
Id. at 758.
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according to some are naturally disposed or socially conditioned (by a
male-dominated society) into "caring and concern" for others, 243 not
members of a community of group-based constraint?
Conversely, why are those with significant mental deficiency,
who surely are constrained by family or society at least as much as
children, not members of a community of group-based constraint and
thus entitled to employ a subjective perspective as defendants? Why
are professionals other than doctors, despite being subject to similar
professional regulation and disciplinary procedures, not members of
communities of group-based constraint? (The doctors' "culture of
infallibility," which Bernstein views as a source of constraint, 2" many
view as a barrier against constraint.) Why is a doctor a member of a
community of group-based constraint, to whom negligence law
"outsources" regulation, for purposes of medical treatment decisions,
but not for purposes of providing medical information to their patients?
In the end, it seems to me that Bernstein's theory of group-based
constraints dissolves into and is more straightforwardly understood as
focusing, consistently with the justice theory, on whether particular
subjective characteristics can be taken into account without
significantly undermining individuals' rights to an equal-freedom
maximizing level of security of their persons and property.
VI. CONCLUSION

Perhaps the best and most useful way to draw together my extended commentary is to set forth some proposed revisions of and
additions to the relevant negligence sections in the draft Restatement
Third, for consideration by the American Law Institute or, more
likely, by individual courts:
§ 3 Negligence
A person's conduct is negligent if the person does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Reasonable care is the
care that would be exercised by the reasonably careful person, who
has proper respect for the persons and property of others as well as
243. See, e.g.,

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS,
ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984).

244. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 764.
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himself/herself. Primary factors to consider in deciding whether a
person's conduct was reasonable are the foreseeable likelihood that it
will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may
ensue, the burden (including foregone benefits) that would be borne
by the person and others if the person takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm, the social value of the affected
interests, and the relationships among and respective rights of the
245
affected persons.
246
§ 4 [formerly § 12] Capacities, Skills, and Knowledge

The reasonably careful person is usually assumed to have:
(a) the physical capacities and skills, mental capacities and
skills, and knowledge of the ordinary adult person, 247 and
(b) such superior physical capacities and skills, mental capacities and skills, and knowledge that are actually possessed by
the person whose conduct is at issue.248
§ 5 [formerly § 11] Disability
(a) If a person has a physical disability that contributed to the
person's allegedly negligent conduct, that disability should be taken
into account in deciding whether the person behaved as a reasonably
careful person (with that disability) would have behaved.249
(b) If a plaintiff has a mental or emotional disability that contributed to the plaintiff's allegedly negligent conduct, that disability
should be taken into account in deciding whether the plaintiff behaved as a reasonably careful person (with that disability) would have
behaved.2 °
(c) If a person fails to behave as a reasonably careful person
would have behaved solely as a result of sudden incapacitation or loss
of consciousness brought about by physical illness that was not
reasonably foreseeable by the person, the person's conduct was not
negligent.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See text accompanying notes 50-63, 68-70, 91-93, 110-13. 123-57, 183-89 supra.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965).
See text accompanying notes 164, 172-74. 179-81 supra.
See text accompanying note 182 supra.
See text accompanying notes 191-93 supra.
See text accompanying notes 194-219 supra.
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§ 6 [formerly § 10] Children25
(a) If a child is a plaintiff, the child's age, intelligence, and experience should be taken into account in deciding whether the child
behaved as a reasonably careful person (with the child's age, intelligence, and experience) would have behaved, except:
(b) If a child is a defendant or was engaged in an activity that
posed a significant danger to others, which those others were not able
without significant burden to discover and avoid, the child's conduct
should be measured against that of the reasonably careful person as
specified in § 4.

251. See text accompanying notes 220-29 supra.

